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ESSAY
THE IMPACT OF SECURITIES LAWS ON DEVELOPING
COMPANIES: WOULD THE WRIGHT BROTHERS HAVE
GOTTEN OFF THE GROUND?
by
Stuart R. Cohn*
Suppose the Wright brothers, to pursue their dreams of manned flight,
needed outside financing. Confronted with the intimidating regulatory
requirements of today's state and federal securities laws, would they ever
have gotten off the ground? With historical illustrations, this Essay presents
an entertaining look at the serious problems that would be encountered
today by entrepreneurs who have ideas but need capital to develop them. It
analyzes the regulatory maze and prohibitions of state and federal securities
laws and concludes that, in today's marketplace, the Wright brothers proba-
bly would have violated several laws to obtain essential financing for their
venture.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Wright brothers never contended with federal or state securities
laws. The first heavier-than-air flying machine was conceived, financed,
and developed between 1899 and 1903, a decade before state securities
laws appeared and thirty years before the federal government's entrance
into the field.
I will not suggest that history would have been different had securi-
ties laws existed during the Wright brothers' inventive period. Quite the
contrary. These Dayton, Ohio siblings needed no outside financial help.'
They developed their ideas through homemade experiments. The wind
tunnel built in their bicycle shop was constructed from a used starch car-
ton, yet it produced results more accurate than those developed by
renowned European scientists. The costs connected with development of
the motor, wings, struts, elevators, and tail sections of their novel aircraft,
as well as the experimental North Carolina flights, were borne by the two
brothers from family resources and the profits of their bicycle shop.
But what if they had needed financial help? And what if our current
securities laws were in place when the experiments were at their peak? I
have answered those questions through a three-act drama presented
below. The story does not have a happy ending. Indeed, it suggests that
the spectacular invention of the aeroplane might not have occurred in
the same manner, at least not for the Wright brothers. If they needed to
raise capital under today's conditions, they would have been met with a
' The description of the Wright brothers' inventive efforts set forth in this
account are taken from a variety of sources. Except for the assumed financing
problems and attorney Horace Alexander, the account of the brothers' development
of the airplane is factually true. A concise history of airplane development appears in
OMEGA G. EAST, WRIGHT BROTHERS NATIONAL MEMORIAL, NORTH CAROLINA (1976).
Other sources reflected in the following account are TOM D. CROUCH, THE BISHOP'S
Boys: A LIFE OF WILBUR AND ORVILLE WRIGHT (1989); FRED KELLY, THE WRIGHT
BROTHERS: A BIOGRAPHY AUTHORIZED BY ORVILLE WRIGHT (1943); and PATRICK B.
NOLAN, THE WRIGHT BROTHERS COLLECTION (1977).
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plethora of statutes and regulations, both federal and state, that could
only have impeded and frustrated their efforts.
The dramatized problems encountered by the Wright brothers are
commensurate with those faced by today's entrepreneurs who possess
ideas and energy but lack the capital to develop, experiment with, and
market their inventions. One should not suppose, however, that the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is averse to reform in this
area. On the contrary, there are numerous recent rule changes designed
to improve the lot of small companies. 2 The problem with such efforts is
their quality, not their quantity. The SEC reforms have failed to alleviate
significant regulatory problems for developing companies that do not
have ready access to capital markets or venture capital firms. Every regis-
tration exemption, except one, is laden with technical provisions that sub-
stantially impair the exemption's attraction. The one exception, Rule
504,3 has its own defects. It is limited in the offering amount, and because
of incompatible state standards, it cannot be utilized in most states with-
out state registration. 4
The SEC knows well the regulatory problems facing small compa-
nies. Its Office of Small Business is devoted to the analysis of the securities
laws' impact upon small-business capital development. 5 The Commis-
sion's staff faces an annual critique and recommendations from partici-
pants at the SEC-sponsored Forum on Small Business. 6 It is therefore
both ironic and disappointing that the Commission appears to be devot-
ing its greatest attention to easing processes for large, well-financed enter-
prises that have little difficulty raising capital on their own terms and
2 Recent reforms include permitting a "testing of the waters" for Regulation A
offerings; the elimination of most Regulation D offering conditions for Rule 504
offerings; the development of the Form SB-i, a more user-friendly registration
statement for small issuers; a substantial compliance provision added to Regulation D;
and recognition through Rule 1001 of a state-oriented accredited investor exemption.
These reforms are described and discussed in further detail below.
I Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1999). Rule 504 permits eligible issuers to raise
up to $1 million every twelve months without offeree, purchaser, disclosure, or
offering limitations. See infra note 39.
4 See infra note 39.
5 The Office of Small Business is part of the Division of Corporation Finance.
Securities & Exch. Comm'n, Q&A: Small Business and the SEC (visited Oct. 8, 1999)
<http://www.sec.gov/smbus/qasbsec.htm>.
6 Each year the SEC sponsors an annual SEC Government-Business Forum on
Small Business Capital Formation. Participants include entrepreneurs, attorneys,
venture capitalists, securities industry specialists, and academics. The Forum develops
a list of specific recommendations to the SEC that invariably includes significant
modification or elimination of exemption conditions. In addition, since 1996, the
SEC has hosted numerous SEC Small Business Town Hall Meetings in various locales
to discuss capital formation issues. Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed
Capital" Exemption, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7644, [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,114, at 81,774 n.39 (Feb. 25, 1999). The common theme in
all of these forums is one of over-regulation and the difficulties faced by small
companies in complying with the technical conditions of registration exemptions.
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timetables. The SEC recently issued perhaps the largest proposed set of
regulations in its history, so large that it was dubbed the "Aircraft Carrier"
proposal. 7 The proposal affects registration statements, underwriting
responsibilities, communications before and during the offering periods,
and a host of related subjects that ease restrictions on so-called "seasoned
issuers," those that are publicly held or are already public reporting com-
panies. For small companies-the ones that truly need regulatory reform
efforts-the proposal offers only a few inconsequential bones. 8 The "Air-
craft Carrier" proposal is likely to dominate the SEC's attention for the
foreseeable future, leaving unaddressed the plight of smaller companies.
Critique of the securities laws does not stem from concerns of under-
regulation or oversight. On the contrary, the federal securities laws are
remarkably broad and effective. One commentator has noted that the
U.S. securities laws are "at their zenith in terms of their demands and
protection of investors," providing "a pure and pristine image of the won-
derful protective benefits that can arise through government regula-
tion."9 His comments, however, are intended as faint praise. Professor
Cox appropriately argues that market changes, especially the globaliza-
tion of securities offerings, require "wholesale review and deregulation"
of our securities laws.' 0 The deregulation argument based on technologi-
cal and marketing developments is equally supported from an entirely
different perspective, namely the concern for capital-raising difficulties of
young and start-up enterprises.
The drama that follows examines securities laws from the perspective
of a developing company. The semifictional account describes the securi-
ties laws problems that the Wright brothers might have faced had they
needed financing. My purpose goes beyond fantasy: It is directed at the
serious need for reform of registration exemptions and, indeed, the regis-
7 The Regulation of Securities Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7606A,
[1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,108 (Nov. 13, 1998)
[hereinafter Regulation of Securities Offerings]. The magnitude of the proposals, as
well as substantial criticism regarding their effect upon certain types of capital-raising,
has led the SEC to consider substantial revision and reproposal. See Aircraft Carrier
Likely to See Reproposal, SEC Official Tells Bar Group; M&A on Target, 31 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1065 (Aug. 13, 1999).
s Regulation of Securities Offerings, supra note 7. Proposals affecting smaller
issuers relate to delaying the time that registration fees must be paid, allowing
incorporation by reference for previously filed SEC reports, permitting increases in
the size of registered offerings on an expedited basis, and permitting earlier use of
the private offering exemption following a withdrawn registered offering. None of
these changes materially affect the capital-raising problems facing many small
companies.
' James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S. Securities Laws in the Shadow of International
Regulatory Competition, LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs., Autumn 1992, at 157, 198.
10 Id. at 198. Professor Cox suggests that the data reflect a relative imbalance
between the unwillingness of foreign companies to subject themselves to U.S.
securities laws and the willingness of U.S. companies to utilize overseas markets. Id. at
183.
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tration process itself. Statutory requirements created more than sixty
years ago in a markedly different economic environment, and regulations
based upon those requirements, do not adequately address capital forma-
tion problems in today's technology-driven and capital-intensive business
world. Registration has long reigned as the dominant statutory require-
ment and default procedure for broad-scale securities offerings. Time,
experience, and technology make it appropriate to consider whether
securities laws based on a registration process have "reached a point of
twilight,""1 as suggested by one commentator. Following the Wright
brothers' saga, this Essay considers policy concerns and recommends
reforms to facilitate capital funding by start-up and developing
businesses.
II. THE STORY
Act I, Scene 1: The First Visit to Their Lawyer, April 1900
It was a short walk from Orville and Wilbur's bicycle shop to the law
office of Horace Alexander. The snows were receding from the streets of
Dayton on this sunny morning in April 1900, as the two brothers strode
swiftly to their meeting.
Orville had earlier alerted Horace Alexander to their purpose. When
the two brothers entered Horace's small office, Horace had on his desk a
copy of both the federal Securities Act of 1899 and the Ohio Securities
Law of 1896.12 Both statutes were borrowed from the County Library, as
Horace knew of no attorney in Dayton who was familiar with these new
laws. 13 Orville was the more outspoken of the two, despite being four
years junior to his brother. His early ventures in the printing business,
starting at age thirteen, gave him a sense of business understanding not
shared by Wilbur. Orville began the discussion by defining the goal as
follows:
" Joel Seligman, Gi'tterdammerung for the Securities Act?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 887
(1997). Professor Seligman suggests that there has been a shift in ideology from the
early concern about fraud to the current concern that "the cost of registration... no
longer can be justified." Id. at 901.
12 The dates of both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Ohio securities law have
been changed for purposes of this fictional account. Ohio's initial securities laws were
adopted in 1913. See 1913 Ohio Laws 743.
11 The lack of experience and knowledge about the securities laws remains today
among many lawyers and is reminiscent of Prof. David Ratner's hilarious (and
perhaps apocryphal) Letters from a Kentucky Lawyer, in DAVID L. RATNER & THOMAS L.
HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 342-44 (5th ed. 1996). A
Kentucky lawyer writes to the SEC (in response to an SEC inquiry) that "[t] here are a
dozen lawyers in this town, and I would not give two cents for what all of us put
together know about Federal laws .... If some poor fellow comes in with a Federal
problem, I tell him to write his Congressman." Id.
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They needed approximately $1.5 million 14 to construct several man-
carrying gliders, to transport the gliders to the site in North Carolina they
had selected for experiments, 15 and to finance those experiments over
several months. The two brothers had already formed the Wright Flying
Machine Company and were prepared to sell stock to raise the necessary
funds.
On a single sheet of paper Orville set forth the proposed budget. On
the right side, under "Receipts," were three figures. One was $300,000, an
amount promised to them by Octave Chanute, the leading American
authority on aviation science and an avid correspondent and supporter of
the two brothers. 16 The second item was $100,000, a promise from their
close boyhood friend, Cordy Ruse, who in 1896 built the first horseless
buggy seen on the streets of Dayton. The goal now was to raise the addi-
tional $1.1 million, the third figure in that right-hand column.
"What do you have in mind for raising the rest?" asked Horace.
"We figured we could raise most of it right here in Dayton," Orville
answered. "We don't know anyone who could give us a large amount, but
lots of people know us and might be willing to put in small amounts. If we
put together a nice little pamphlet, we could probably interest quite a few
people. Our good friend Lou Poston, a stockbroker over at Daniel &
Sons, told me that he'd try to get his company to help us raise the
money."
"The other question I've got, boys, is whether you foresee any profit
coming from this project. I mean, why would someone invest in your
company?"
The question caught the brothers short. Profit was not the motiva-
tion of either Orville or Wilbur. The bicycle shop provided them a steady
income, they lived in their father's home, and neither had a spouse or
family to support. Since their childhood days, when they spent countless
hours duplicating ever-larger models of a toy that lifted itself into the air
14 The dollar figures used in this drama are clearly inappropriate for 1900
standards and do not reflect actual facts. The figures have been chosen to relate to
existing monetary limits in registration exemptions. It has been estimated that the
Wright brothers' total costs to develop and fly their first plane were less than $1,000.
KELLY, supra note 1, at 112.
15 The brothers sought an experimental site that was both isolated and sandy and
that offered strong, constant winds. They studied a table of average hourly wind
velocities recorded at 120 U.S. Weather Bureau stations. Kitty Hawk, North Carolina,
a little-known place at the time, was selected as the most suitable site. CROUCH, supra
note 1, at 182.
16 Octave Chanute was a Frenchman who emigrated to the United States and
whose principal occupation involved building railroads and railroad bridges. He
became fascinated by the possibility of flight in his later years and established a glider
camp on the sand dunes of Lake Michigan. The data he accumulated were used
extensively by the Wright brothers, with whom he was in frequent correspondence.
He visited Kitty Hawk on several occasions during the early period of the Wrights'
experiments.
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with the help of a wound-up rubber band, the brothers had been fasci-
nated by the possibility of flight. Otto Lilienthal's glider experiments in
Germany were widely reported and had piqued their growing interest.17
Curiously, it was the failures of others that intrigued them the most. Sev-
eral of the great pioneers of flight were killed in glider flights or simply
gave up. The insoluble problem, thus far, was maintaining the glider's
equilibrium in varying wind conditions. Both Orville and Wilbur per-
ceived the problem as not too dissimilar from understanding the forces
controlling a bicyclist's balance, especially when turning corners. What
began as late night discussions regarding centers of gravity had eventually
evolved into small, scale-model gliders. It was the challenge of maintain-
ing airborne equilibrium that kept their interest going, not the thought
of personal profit.
Nevertheless, they both realized that a company without a profit
potential would not attract investors. Wilbur therefore recounted what
Octave Chanute had told them of the interest shown by the U.S. Army in
a piloted flying machine. Surveillance of military fields by balloon flights
was too limited by weather and wind conditions to be dependable. A
manned glider that could soar at a substantial height and remain aloft for
minutes at a time held considerable promise for reconnaissance opera-
tions. The French and English governments were similarly impressed with
the military potential for such machines. Wilbur added some speculative
ideas of his own, such as flights over rivers and impassable areas.
"Will the figure you mentioned, $1.5 million, be enough to get you
through all of the experimental stages?" Horace inquired.
"Not all of them," replied Orville. "If all goes well in North Carolina,
we will be ready to build a motor-powered machine that will supply its
own lifting force. We'll need more money then, and surely more experi-
ments, but how much and for how long, we're just not sure at this time."
Orville and Wilbur were all too familiar with the danger of going into
a venture with too little capital. Ten years earlier, their newspaper, The
Evening Item, went out of business less than four months after its first pub-
lication. They realized in hindsight that they had begun with too little
capital to compete against the dozen newspapers already existing in Day-
ton. For this venture, larger by far, they would need substantial financial
commitments.
"Where does Octave Chanute reside?" asked Horace.
"In Chicago."
"Any other prospects?"
17 Otto Lilienthal was the most eminent scientist in the world working on the
development of manned flight. His book on bird flight, DER VOGELFLUG ALs
GRUNDLAGE DER FLIEGEKUNST (1889), and his essays on glider flights in 1894 were the
recognized authorities on aeronautics. He made several hundred successful glider
flights but was killed in such a flight in 1896.
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"Octave tells us that he's got friends in New York who could give us
some money," answered Orville. "As for the rest, we've sold a lot of
bicycles since '93 and repaired a lot, too. Those people know us well and
might be willing to put some money into this project. And we've got lots
of connections in the Church, both here and in Indiana."1 8
"How soon do you need the money?" inquired Horace.
"As soon as possible, especially if we're going to get to North Caro-
lina before winter sets in."
Horace was silent for a few seconds. Measuring his words carefully,
he said, "Boys, I need to be frank with you. I've never handled a matter
under these new securities laws. And I don't know anyone in Dayton who
has. From what I've read, the laws are complex and strict. There's no
room for error, and both the federal and state authorities can stop your
offering if you're not in full compliance with every jot and tittle of the
law. From what you're telling me, you're planning to raise more money
down the line. If we do something wrong on this offering, we might not
get a second chance. I'm going to need some time to digest all of this and
figure out what you can and cannot do. I know that time is precious, but
with these laws we can't afford to make a mistake. Give me a little while to
do some thinking and make some inquiries. I'll get back to you as soon as
I'm able."
Orville and Wilbur were uncharacteristically silent on their walk back
to their shop. Wilbur was lost in thought about the size and shape of the
rear stabilizer he had been sketching. Orville was wondering why their
attorney seemed so worried. Why should government agencies be con-
cerned with this venture? He and his brother were asking for voluntary
investments, not planning to rob a bank.
Act I, Scene 2: Later, the Same Day
As Orville was pondering the mysteries of the securities laws, Horace
Alexander was musing over policy. He remembered that there were quite
a few scandals in the past twenty years by traveling salesmen who enticed
unsuspecting and trusting investors to part with their money in return for
a gilt-edged certificate representing a stake in the growing corporations
back East. Unfortunately, some of those corporations were nonexistent,
and some that existed had little more than the certificates themselves as
assets. Investors' money often got no further east than the salesmen
themselves, who were last seen on trains heading toward the setting sun.
18 The Wright brothers' father, Milton W. Wright, became bishop of the United
Brethren Church in 1878, which caused him to move his family from Dayton, Ohio, to
Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The family moved back to Dayton in 1884, when Bishop Wright
became editor of "Religious Telescope," a church publication.
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It took several years for purchasers to realize that the promises and
certificates had about as much substance as so many feet of blue sky. 19
The losses led to a call for protection. Kansas enacted the first statute
regulating the offer and sale of securities. 20 Within twenty years, nearly
every state in the union had enacted a form of "blue sky" law. 2 1 The stat-
utes were fairly uniform, most requiring advance state registration of
securities to be sold, licensing of sales personnel, and civil and criminal
penalties for registration or fraud violations. 22
Horace scanned through the Ohio statute, hoping to see exceptions
to the registration requirement. What he found was not encouraging. An
exemption existed for offerings that met the federal private offering
exemption. 23 The Wright brothers also could avoid registration in Ohio if
they limited their sales in the state to not more than ten people.2 4 Ohio
also had adopted the Uniform State Limited Offering Exemption
(ULOE), based in large measure on the Rule 505 federal exemption. 25
19 Hence the name, Blue Sky legislation, to refer colloquially to state securities
statutes. The origin of the term is uncertain. In Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539,
550 (1917) (second internal quotations omitted), the Court referred to such
legislation as attempting to curb promoters from selling interests having no more
substance than "so many feet of 'blue sky.'"
20 SeeAct of Mar. 10, 1911, ch. 133, 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 210, entitled "AN ACT to
provide for the regulation and supervision of investment companies and providing
penalties for the violation thereof."
21 Nevada was the sole exception. See 1 Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 39 (1989).
22 State blue sky legislation may have been motivated in part by other than public
protection concerns. Securities filings and fees generate considerable state revenue,
often well in excess of enforcement and administrative expenses. Blue Sky laws
mandating filings and fees offered an easy revenue-creating process. See id. at 150
(citing North American Securities Administrators Association 1984 Study); see also
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REv.
347, 351 (1991-1992)
[O]ur research reveals that while many proponents of the blue sky laws were
attempting to advance the public interest as they perceived it, the statutes
themselves were invented, and thereafter promoted in the legislative process, by
defined vested interests, including the owners of smaller banks and savings
institutions who saw blue sky legislation as a means for suppressing competition
for depositors' funds.
Id.
23 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.03(Q) (West Supp. 1999). The National
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat.
3416 (1996), amended section 18 of the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b), to
create a class of "covered securities" for which state registration provisions are
preempted. Among the covered securities are offerings made pursuant to Rule 506,
17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1999), the federal private offering exemption. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77r(b) (4) (D). Rule 506 offerings are discussed infra note 44.
24 See OHIO REv. CODE § 1707.03(O)(b).
25 See id. § 1707.03(W). Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1999), is discussed infra
note 61 and accompanying text. In general, Rule 505 permits offerings within a
twelve-month period valued up to $5 million, provided there are not more than thirty-
five nonaccredited investors. Other conditions include disclosure requirements and
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That exemption was limited to thirty-five nonaccredited investors, 26 and
Horace wondered whether that limitation would fit the Wright brothers'
needs. Ohio also had recently adopted an exemption for offerings lim-
ited to accredited investors. 27 "Accredited investors" was a new term to
Horace, but he found it defined in Rule 501 of Regulation D and saw that
it referred principally to institutional and wealthy investors. 28 Horace
noted that one of the advantages of this exemption was that it permitted
a general announcement of the offering,29 a form of solicitation that
none of the other Ohio exemptions permitted. Nevertheless, Horace
doubted that Orville and Wilbur could raise enough money just from
accredited investors. He knew from experience with his few well-to-do cli-
ents that they were conservative in their investments, or at least they
would have substantial doubts about a venture as risky and uncertain as
the aeroplane development.
If the Wright brothers decided to register their offering in Ohio,
Horace knew that he could put together a prospectus that would satisfy
Ohio's disclosure requirements. What concerned him, though, was the
statutory provision that permitted the state administrator to reject the
registration application on grounds that the offering was "on grossly
unfair terms."3 0 This so-called merit review concept was a central element
in most state statutes. 31 It was considered an important protection against
flimflam offerings that had seduced gullible citizens in the prestatute
limitations on the manner of offering. The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption
(ULOE) added some requirements, including a suitability requirement for
purchasers, although that particular requirement is not included in the Ohio statute.
See OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.03(W).
26 See OHIO REv. CODE § 1707.03(W). Rule 505 allows no more than thirty-five
nonaccredited purchasers of the securities. See infra note 62 for a definition of
accredited investors.
27 See OHIO REv. CODE § 1707.03(Y).
28 Rule 501, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (1999).
2 See Omo REV. CODE § 1707.03(Y) (6). The announcement must be limited to a
brief description of the issuer's business and the security to be issued.
30 Id. § 1707.09(K).
31 "Merit review" remains a component of the securities laws of most states,
although in differing forms. The traditional "fair, just, and equitable" standard is
found in approximately twenty states. Most states authorize denial of registration if
the administrator finds that the offering may tend to work a fraud upon investors. See,
e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.209(1)(e) (West 1998). Fraud often is defined in
administrative regulations, many of which adopt North American Securities
Administrators Association (NASAA) guidelines on pricing, options, cheap stock,
capitalization, and other factors. For example, the guideline regarding promoters'
investment requires that initial and early investors have an equity investment equal to
at least 10% of the proposed offering. If the Wright brothers had been raising $1.5
million, their personal investment would have to have been $150,000, an amount
perhaps beyond their reach. Some states require an even higher percentage of
investment by promoters. See, e.g., Florida, FL. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. § 3E-700.005
(1998) (if the ratio of promoters' equity to total equity is less than 15%, the offering is
not considered fair, just, or equitable unless the offering has a firm commitment
underwriter and the issuer's net worth exceeds $100,000).
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days. Review by knowledgeable state employees would, it was hoped, limit
offerings to only those who had strong economic viability.3 2 Horace
understood its purpose and approved protecting the unsophisticated
from financial follies, but he had concerns that Ohio administrators
might not look favorably upon his clients' novel and financially uncertain
venture. Would the administrators regard an offering as "grossly unfair"
where most of the capital would be provided by outsiders who would have
no control over the company, the two indispensable principals were con-
tinually risking their lives, and there was no evidence of any market for
the aeroplane even if (and it was an enormous "if") a machine ever got
off the ground? Given the excellent chance that every penny invested
would be lost, Horace feared that the offering would be viewed as grossly
unfair.33
Horace settled upon writing a letter to Nathan Gooding, the state
representative from Dayton's district. Horace explained his concern and
asked Nathan to inquire at the securities division about its policy regard-
ing merit review of new and untried ventures. Perhaps some advance
notice and discussion could allay problems. Horace posted the letter and
turned his attention to federal law.
Act I, Scene 3: Several Days Later
The Dayton Morning Sun was Horace's morning habit, along with
fried eggs and hash brown potatoes at Molly's Grill. Several days after his
initial meeting with Orville and Wilbur, Horace was more than a little
startled to read an advertisement in the Sun announcing "a bold and
exciting venture, to wit, the development by Orville and Wilbur Wright of
a motor driven, man-carrying flying machine." The advertisement stated,
"The Wrights are looking for interested investors for the Wright Flying
Machine Company, an adventure of unparalleled dimensions. You are
invited to call at our establishment at 1127 West Third Street, City, for
further details."
Orville was opening the cycle shop when Horace arrived, newspaper
in hand.
"Orville," Horace asked in a deceptively calm manner, pointing to
the advertisement, "what's this all about?"
32 Considerable debate exists regarding the efficacy and justification for merit
review. See, e.g., Conrad G. Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit
Requirements?, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 79; Hugh H. Makens, Who Speaks For the Investor? An
Evaluation of the Assault on Merit Regulation, 13 U. BALT. L. REv. 435 (1984); James S.
Mofsky & Robert D. Tollison, Demerit in Merit Regulation, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 367 (1977).
3 See Milton C. Boesel, Jr., Analysis of the Ohio Securities Act, 5 W. REs. L. REv. 352,
357 (1954) ("By the use of this flexible phrase, issues which technically comply with
the provisions of the Act and do not involve fraud may nevertheless be prohibited if
the Division feels the terms are not in the best interest of the public." (emphasis
added)).
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"Nothing much, Horace," Orville replied nonchalantly. "We have to
get started before winter sets in and thought that we should line up some
interested investors. Don't worry, we won't sell them anything without
your approval. We printed some little information sheets for anyone
interested. In fact, we've already given out about a dozen to some
customers."
"Orville," responded Horace, "I hate to sound like your pompous
lawyer, but the securities laws are muddy waters. You really should check
with me before doing anything like this."
"Don't worry, Horace, we won't take a farthing until you give us the
go-ahead."
"What does the information sheet say?"
"Here's a copy. It describes the work we've done so far and our plans
to take a machine to North Carolina later this year. At the bottom, there's
a place for someone to tear off the paper and let us know if they would be
interested in investing in our venture. That's when we'll give them
whatever other information you think we should."
"Fellows, please, do not take any money from anyone until I can
make sure we're doing this right. One mistake could doom our efforts.
The law is that strict. I've been doing some research into what we need to
do, and I'll have some answers for you very soon."
"Okay," Orville replied, "but remember that we need to start bring-
ing in some money."
"Give me a couple of days. Meanwhile, please, no sales of any stock,
and no more advertisements."
Act I, Scene 4: Horace Explains the Options
When Horace returned to the bicycle shop several days later, scale-
model gliders of varying sizes and shapes were strewn along the floor.
Wilbur was kneeling in front of an electric fan, manipulating a mario-
nette-like paper glider. As the glider gyrated before the fan, Wilbur called
out numbers to Orville who recorded them in a notebook.
"We're trying to figure out the drag problem, Horace," Orville called
out. "Gliders need lift, but once in the air, the drag brings them down.
Maximum lift with minimum drag-that's the riddle. I think we're close,
though."
After twenty minutes, Horace was able to command the attention of
his two inventor-clients. He didn't mind the wait, because he was not
looking forward to what he had to say.
"Boys," he started, "I have to tell you that these new securities laws
are not helpful. They're supposed to protect the public against fraudu-
lent schemes, but it looks to me like they mostly hurt young inventors like
you.
"We're not doing anything fraudulent," responded Wilbur, "so we
should have no worries about that."
1999] WOULD WRIGHT BROTHERS HAVE GOTTEN OFF GROUND? 327
"You'd think so," Horace replied, "but these registration provisions
are so time consuming and costly that they make it near-impossible for
young entrepreneurs like you to raise money. Here's what I've found.
First, for federal law purposes, you have to file a registration statement
unless you can qualify for an exemption.3 4 Preparing a registration state-
ment will probably take a couple of months,3 5 then the SEC will have to
review it. And meanwhile, you can't sell a single share of stock. You're
stuck in a long timetable and running up expenses with no way to pay for
them. Once you've got the SEC go-ahead, the questions become how
much can you raise, and how quickly? Who knows? You're a new and
untested company. What's more, registration entails potential liabilities
that might not be imposed in unregistered offerings.3 6 In a nutshell,
registration involves huge problems in terms of time, costs, and potential
liabilities, all the while not knowing whether an offering will even be
successful."
"Anything that takes several months won't work," Orville noted.
"We've got to have money in hand within a month to prepare for our
North Carolina experiments."
" Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994), prohibits the
offer or sale of a security through the means of interstate commerce "[u]nless a
registration statement is in effect."
The Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), has been codified, as
amended, at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z, 77aa (1994). References to specific sections of the
1933 Act correspond to letters of the alphabet as follows: section 1 is 15 U.S.C. § 77a,
section 2 is 15 U.S.C. § 77b, and so on. Several sections referred to in this Essay are
not in the original Securities Act of 1933.
35 A small business issuer, defined in Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1999), as a
company with less than $25 million in both annual revenues and public float, is
eligible to use the Form SB-i registration statement to register up to $10 million of
securities to be sold for cash. The basic registration form, Form S-1, must be used if
no other form is permitted. 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1999). Form SB-i disclosure
requirements are very similar to those of Form S-1, the principal exception being that
financial statements in the Form SB-1 do not have to conform to the stringent
accounting standards applicable to the Form S-1. Id. § 239.9.
36 Section 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994), imposes disclosure liability
for omissions or misstatements in registration statements. Issuers have no defense
under this provision. Other potential defendants listed in the provision, including
directors, chief officers, underwriters, and experts, may defend on the grounds of due
diligence in reviewing and preparing the registration statement. Exempt offerings are
not subject to section 11. Rule lOb-5 liability is premised upon scienter, or
recklessness, a much higher standard of culpability than for section 11 liability.
Although some exempt offerings might be subject to liability under section 12(a) (2),
15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (Supp. III 1997), that provision applies only to those who
actually solicited the purchasers. See Pinter v. Dahi, 486 U.S. 622 (1988). One
commentator has suggested that the impact of section 11 may cause issuers to forego
registration in favor of nonregistered offerings, a result that may counteract the
statute's purpose by reducing rather than enhancing the quality of investor
protection. See James D. Cox, The Fundamentals of an Electronic-Based Federal Securities
Act, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 857, 878 (1997).
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"That's why I've abandoned the registration idea. We need to fit the
offering into a registration exemption. Some registration exemptions are
in the statute,3 7 and others have been created by the SEC."3 8
"Is there an exemption for a business as small as ours?" asked Orville.
"Well, you'd think so, but there's not. There is an exemption for
offerings up to $1 million in a twelve-month period.3 9 You could raise $1
million this year, $1 million the next, and so on. But, because you boys
need more than a million, that exemption won't work."
"Afraid so. In fact, we're beginning to think it might take a little
more than that."
37 Statutory exemptions in the 1933 Act are as follows: section 3(a) (11) (the
intrastate exemption); section 4(2) (the private offering exemption); and section
4(6) (the accredited investor exemption). The SEC has used its rulemaking authority
to create administrative exemptions under both the intrastate, Rule 147, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.147 (1999), and private offering, Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1999),
exemptions. Rules 147 and 506 do not necessarily mirror their statutory counterparts.
Compliance with either the statutory or administrative provisions suffices for
exemption purposes.
38 Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1994), authorizes the SEC to
grant exemptions of up to $5 million where it finds that registration "is not necessary
in the public interest and for the protection of investors." The principal exemptions
created by the SEC under that authority are Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.264
(1999), for offerings up to $5 million, and Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508
(1999), containing the exemptions under Rule 504 (offerings up to $1 million) and
Rule 505 (offerings up to $5 million). The SEC also has created Rule 1001, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.1001 (1999), the so-called "California exemption," which exempts offerings up
to $5 million by California-based companies that comply with certain specific state law
requirements of the California Corporation Code, in particular, purchaser suitability
requirements. See CAL. CoP. CODE § 25102 (West Supp. 1999). The SEC is prepared
to grant a similar exemption for offerings in other states that adopt similar standards,
but to date no state has submitted a request. The National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996 added section 28 to the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (Supp.
III 1997), giving broad, additional exemptive powers to the SEC. To date, the
Commission has not issued any registration exemptions under those powers. It has
used its authority to increase the allowable amount of securities that may be offered in
Rule 701 offerings under employee compensation plans. Rule 701, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.701 (1999).
1o See Rule 504 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1999). Rule 504 is the most
liberal of all exemptions. There are no specific disclosure requirements, there are no
limitations on the number or qualifications of purchasers, there are no limitations on
the manner of offering, and shares sold under Rule 504 are not regarded as restricted
securities. However, most states do not exempt offerings that are as unregulated as
Rule 504; thus, issuers cannot utilize Rule 504 in those states. On February 19, 1999,
the Securities and Exchange Commission tightened Rule 504 by amending it to
prohibit general solicitation and general advertising unless the offering is (a)
registered under a state law requiring public filing and presale delivery of a disclosure
document to investors or (b) exempt under a state exemption that permits
solicitation and advertising as long as sales are made only to accredited investors. See
SEC Adopts Registration Reforms to Deter Fraud in Microcap Stocks, 31 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 237 (Feb. 19, 1999).
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"There is the so-called private offering exemption. 40 It's in the stat-
ute and is intended for limited offerings that are not widely publicized or
marketed. You can raise as much as you want with that exemption. The
problem is that the Supreme Court has interpreted that exemption to
apply only to investors able to fend for themselves,4 1 whatever that
means."
"What does it mean?" Wilbur asked.
"Well, it's not at all clear. Banks and major financial institutions fit
because they have the economic wherewithal and ability to evaluate
investments. But those institutions usually don't invest in small compa-
nies like yours. As for individuals, courts have held that the private offer-
ing exemption applies only to investors who have so-called sophistication,
meaning experience and some financial know-how. 42 Not too many of
our good citizens of Dayton would qualify."
"I don't understand," interrupted Wilbur. "If we tell everyone all
about us, about the risks and problems, and we do it in writing up front,
I Seesection 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994) ("The provisions of
section 77e of this title shall not apply to-(2) transactions by an issuer not involving
any public offering."); Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1999) (created by the SEC as a
"safe harbor" private offering exemption). Rule 506 is contained in Regulation D, 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (1999).
41 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). From 1947 through
1951 the company sold approximately $2 million in common stock to hundreds of
employees through an employee stock purchase program. There appeared to be no
limitation on which employees were eligible to purchase stock, although the company
argued that the program was limited to key employees. The SEC sought to enjoin the
sales on grounds that no registration exemption existed. The lower courts rejected
the SEC argument, finding that the sales were within the private offering exemption
because they were limited in scope, but the Supreme Court held otherwise, stating
that the private offering exemption was not applicable where offerees needed "the
protections afforded by registration." Id. at 127.
42 See, e.g., Spatz v. Borenstein, 513 F. Supp. 571, 585 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("[P]rivate
offerings, necessarily made to sophisticated investors, permit alternative methods of
full disclosure."); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 637 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Intertie took no
steps to assure that the offering and sale were directed only to a small number of
sophisticated, informed investors. ... "). However, case law is not uniform regarding
the sophistication requirement for section 4(2) offerings. See Doran v. Petroleum
Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 902 n.10 (5th Cir. 1977) ("We do not intimate that
evidence of the offerees' sophistication is required in all cases to establish a private
offering exemption under § 4(2)."). It may be possible under the contrasting position
that the statutory exemption could be met by full disclosure to a person of ordinary
intelligence and understanding. For contrasting views on whether sophistication is a
required element of the statutory exemption, see 3A HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL &
SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW §§ 3.45, 3.47 (2d ed. 1999)
(stating that sophistication is required); Carl Schneider, The Statutory Law of Private
Placement, 14 REV. SEC. REG. 869, 876 (1981) (statin that the "better view" is that
sophistication is not an independent requirement). For a general discussion of the
sophistication issue, see C. Edward Fletcher, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081. A circuit-by-circuit survey of the sophistication
issue is set forth in STUART R. COHN, SECURITIES COUNSELING FOR NEW AND
DEVELOPING COMPANIES § 6.06 (1993).
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are you saying that an average person in Dayton who doesn't have invest-
ment experience can't buy our stock?"
"That's the way I read it," Horace responded. "It's not enough that
you give full disclosure. The buyers must have this so-called sophistica-
tion. And it's not just financial know-how. It might even mean that they
have to understand your particular offering and the risks involved. 43 Now,
there is a way around this, and that is to use the Rule 506 exemption,
which also applies to private offerings. In a Rule 506 offering, people who
lack the so-called sophistication can purchase their shares through some-
one called a purchaser representative. 44 That person is like an agent and
is supposed to have the sophistication that the purchaser lacks."
"Excuse me," interrupted Orville. "Now you've mentioned a rule.
Before you were talking about the statute. Are there two exemptions or
one?"
"Two," Horace replied. "One is the exemption in the statute that
simply says you have an exemption if the offering is not public. The other
is the one that the SEC created in Rule 506, which is chock full of specific
conditions."4
5
"Why would we want to use the rule if it's full of specific conditions?"
Orville inquired.
"Because the rule offers a couple of advantages," responded Horace.
"First, it only looks at purchasers, so you don't have to worry about the
qualifications of persons who were made offers but didn't buy your
shares. Second, the rule explicitly permits agents, so-called purchaser rep-
resentatives, to act for unsophisticated buyers. It's not at all clear that
courts will permit agents the statutory exemption. '46
13 See, e.g., Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 373 n.3 (10th Cir. 1973) (denying
private offering exemption with respect to a clearly sophisticated real estate investor
who was characterized by the court as "a babe in the woods when it came to stocks").
4 Rule 506(b)(2)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (1999), permits the use of a
purchaser representative where the purchaser's knowledge and experience do not or
doubtfully qualify under the sophistication requirement. Conditions for use of a
purchaser representative are set forth in Rule 501(h), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (h) (1999).
Case law is sparse as to whether a purchaser representative is permissible under the
statutory exemption, section 4(2). See, e.g., Parker v. Broom, 820 F.2d 966 (8th Cir.
1987) (upholding a private offering when one investor represented himself and
business associates who also became investors).
15 For a review of Rule 506 requirements in the context of a lawyer's letter to a
client, see Marc H. Morgenstern, Private Placement Guidelines-A Lawyer's Letter to a
First-Time Issuer, 48 Bus. LAw. 257 (1992).
'6 The use of purchaser representatives in a section 4(2) offering has not been
judicially resolved. In SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 646 (9th Cir. 1980), the court gave
mixed signals on this question. The fact that over 60% of the investors were
represented by others evidenced a lack of investor sophistication, according to the
court. However, the court also expressed concern that the representatives might not
have been qualified, implying that the use of qualified representatives might be
appropriate. See also Parker v. Broom, 820 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding private
offering where one investor represented himself and business associates).
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"Can our carpenter, Andy, buy shares?" Wilbur asked.
"Yes, if we use the Rule 506 exemption and Andy is represented by
someone who qualifies as a purchaser. A friend, a lawyer, anyone will do.
But under Rule 506 we can't have more than thirty-five nonaccredited
investors like Andy."
"As I see it, then," Orville interjected, "we've got two choices on this
private offering exemption. One is to use Rule 506, which will limit us to
thirty-five unaccredited persons, or whatever ordinary persons are called,
and we've got to make sure that those persons are represented by some-
one who is sophisticated if they're not. The other choice is to go with the
exemption that's in the statute. What's it called, again?"
"Section 4(2)," Horace replied, "and you're right. If you go with the
statutory exemption, there's no limit on the number of ordinary persons,
as you call them, who could be purchasers, provided every one of them
meets the sophistication requirement. On the other hand, section 4(2) is
much more strict about making offers. Unlike Rule 506, which only con-
cerns itself with who your purchasers are, section 4(2) requires that even
persons who are offered shares must meet the disclosure and sophistica-
tion requirements."
"Can't we avoid that problem by making sure that we give offers only
to people who meet the qualifications?" Orville asked.
"You could do that if it weren't for the fact that the notion of an offer
is very broadly defined in the statute. 47 The statute doesn't use the term
the same way we do in contract law. For example, you're offering to sell
these bicycles because they are priced and ready to sell to whomever
walks in the door. But suppose you don't have a price on one of them, or
you just have a picture of a bicycle on your counter. Under contract law,
we wouldn't say that you have offered that bicycle for sale. But under the
securities law, the mere fact that you have tried to raise someone's inter-
est in your stock is considered an offer, even if you're both a long way
from any kind of commitment. '48
'Just talking with people about the fact that we're selling stock can
be an offer?" Orville asked incredulously.
"Orville, don't look at me that way. I didn't make the law," answered
Horace.
47 Section 2(a)(3) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (Supp. II 1996),
defines an offer to sell to include "every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation
of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value."
48 See, e.g., SEC v. Thomas D. Kienlen Corp., 755 F. Supp. 936 (D. Or. 1991)
(issuer planning a registered offering held to have engaged in improper "offers" both
through postcards advertising a meeting to learn about the proposed offering and
brochures handed out at the meeting); SEC v. Arvida Corp., 169 F. Supp. 211
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (answering questions from the press regarding proposed offering
held to be an offer to sell).
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"But there's a big difference between selling stock and asking for
interested inquiries. How can there be any problem with asking people if
they want more information?" Wilbur argued.
"That's what I would have thought," Horace answered, "until I
started reading some of the caselaw and SEC no-action letters.49 It seems
that the ban on advertisements applies to offers, and offers are broadly
defined to include any attempt to solicit interest in buying shares.50 It
doesn't matter if you tell them that they can't buy anything now and that
they can't make any purchase until after they receive a disclosure docu-
ment.51 You can't have an advertisement because that would be an offer,
and an offer cannot be made except to qualified investors.52 No doubt
some of the magazine readers would qualify under the private offering
exemption to be investors, but there's also no doubt that some readers
would not qualify. And the way I understand, if you've got one unquali-
fied offeree, that's the end of your exemption."
" A no-action letter is an SEC staff response to a request by a putative seller or
buyer of securities that asks the staff to agree that, if the transaction is effected in the
proposed manner, the SEC would take "no action" (hence the name for the process)
under the securities laws. Such letters and the SEC responses are published and
provide an excellent source of guidance regarding the SEC's position on various
matters, although the staff responses are not technically formal Commission
positions.
5' In Damson Oil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,916, at 84,357 (July 5, 1974), an advertisement making
no reference to a specific offering but asking for reader response from those who
want "[t]o find out more" was regarded by the SEC as an improper first step in the
offering process. In SEC v. Freeman, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,361, at 93,243 (Mar. 3, 1978), an advertisement in a local newspaper that "equity
positions" were available precluded the issuer's claimed section 4(2) exemption. The
court stated, "This apparent pattern of soliciting offerees from among the public at
large casts grave doubt on the claim that all offerees were qualified, even if the
advertising of 'equity positions' is not itself considered to be an offer."
51 See, e.g., Gerald F. Gerstenfeld, SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 20, 1985), available
in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (advertisement by syndicator of limited
partnerships that did not refer to any specific investment but asked readers to call or
write for more information was regarded by the SEC as an offer of securities even if
the syndicator had no current offerings and was only compiling a list of potential
investors for future offerings).
52 SEC pronouncements on the private offering exemption have consistently
emphasized the limited manner of offering as a primary component of the
exemption. In SEC Release No. 33-285, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2740, at 2911
(Jan. 24, 1935), the SEC General Counsel wrote:
I have very serious doubts as to whether in many of those cases where it is stated
that an offering is to be made only to an insubstantial number of persons, there may
not be preliminary conversations for the purpose of ascertaining which of various
possible purchasers would be willing to accept an offer of the security in question if it
were made to them. Any such preliminary negotiations or conversations with a
substantial number of prospective purchasers would, in my opinion, cause the
offering in question to be a public offering, thereby necessitating prior registration of
the security in question.
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"Just a second," Wilbur interrupted, "maybe I don't understand
something. It sounds like you're saying that if we make an offer to a
friend to buy our shares, and he doesn't meet the so-called sophistication
requirement, we lose the statutory exemption even if he doesn't buy a
single share."
"You understand it all too well," Horace replied.
"But why should anyone worry about offers to people who don't
invest?" continued Wilbur.
"I wish I could give you a good reason, but I'm as stumped to defend
that policy as you are. A big part of the problem is the way the statute is
written. It talks about offers, notjust sales. So we can't blame the SEC. In
fact, the SEC took a fairly bold step in Rule 506 by limiting the inquiry to
purchasers. But as to section 4(2), offeree qualifications are still a
problem."
"I feel the same as Wilbur," asserted Orville. "If we sell shares only to
persons who are qualified, who cares if offers might have been made to
nonqualified persons?"
"I agree, no one should care. No one has been harmed in any way.
But that's the way the law has been written and that's the way the SEC
and courts have been interpreting it. Offers to unqualified people ruin
the statutory exemption. If the exemption is lost, you could be sued."
"But if the only people who buy shares are qualified," Wilbur asked,
"who could sue us for making offers to unqualified persons?"
"Ay, there's the rub, if I get my Shakespeare right," Horace
responded. "If you don't follow every detail of the exemption, the exemp-
tion is lost. If you're still within the one-year statute of limitations,5 3 any
purchaser, or all of them together, can sue to get their money back. It's
automatic, there is no defense to a registration violation. I read one case
where an admittedly sophisticated investor got his money back because
the company couldn't prove that other offerees who weren't purchasers
were qualified. 54 And if you and Orville helped sell the shares, they can
recover their money from you, even though you didn't take a nickel for
yourself. 55
"Suppose we concentrate on Rule 506," Orville suggested. "Maybe we
can find the right combination of qualified investors plus thirty-five
others. We can get an advertisement into Aeronautical Annual, which is
coming out in a few weeks. Their readers know about flying machines,
the risks and problems, and I would imagine that some of them could
53 SeeThe Securities Act of 1933 §13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1994). An action under
section 12(1), which is the registration liability provision, must be brought within one
year from date of violation.
54 See Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977).
55 See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988) (holding that liability under section
12(1) extends to all persons who solicit others on issuer's behalf, whether motivated
either by self-interest or a desire to benefit the issuer).
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meet the sophistication standards. We'll ask anyone who is interested to
write to us for a brochure."
"Not a brochure. It's called a private placement memorandum, and
it will be pretty lengthy and detailed. 56 But I'm afraid the magazine ad
won't work. That would be general advertising, just what we can't do."
The brothers could only shake their heads at what they were hearing.
An advertisement that only asks people to let the company know if they
are interested in receiving additional information violates the law. It
doesn't matter what the advertisement says, it doesn't matter who reads it,
and it doesn't matter that only sophisticated people end up buying the
stock. In fact, Orville realized, the brochures they've been giving to cus-
tomers and the advertisement in the Dayton newspaper already must
have violated the private offering exemption.
"I've got an idea," Wilbur piped up. "Octave Chanute can give us
$300,000. He thinks that he could raise another $500,000 from friends in
New York. We'll get that money in, then we'll raise the rest under the $1
million exemption you mentioned."
"I like your ingenuity, Wilbur, but unfortunately the SEC has already
thought of that. They've developed what they call the integration doc-
trine. 5 7 Again, it's something that's not altogether clear, but it seems that
if you have more than one type of offering within the same time period,
all the offerings will be treated as if they are part of a single offering. If
two or more offerings are integrated, you've got to find a single exemp-
tion that fits all the offers and sales in that combined offering. Sales to
Chanute and others would probably be integrated with your offers to eve-
56 Rule 506 offerings must meet the information requirements set forth in Rule
502(b) (2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (2) (1999). There is no specific provision regarding
disclosure requirements in a section 4(2) offering. Courts have generally required
that offerees receive information consistent with what would be in a registration
statement. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953) ("The
employees here were not shown to have access to the kind of information which
registration would disclose."); SEC v. Universal Major Indus., 546 F.2d 1044, 1047 (2d
Cir. 1976) ("The focus of inquiry ... is... whether they have the information which a
registration would disclose, or have access to it.").
57 One of the earliest SEC statements on the integration doctrine was issued in
connection with the intrastate offering exemption. Exemption for Local Offerings
from Registration, SEC Release No. 33-4434, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2270, at
2607 (Dec. 6, 1961). The SEC listed the following factors, any one of which may cause
two or more offerings to be deemed integrated:
(1) Are the offerings part of a single plan of financing; (2) do the offerings
involve issuance of the same class of security; (3) are the offerings made at or
about the same time; (4) is the same type of consideration to be received, and (5)
are the offerings made for the same general purpose.
Id.
This five-factor test is repeated in near-identical form in Rule 147, applicable to intra-
state offerings, and Rule 502(a) of Regulation D, applicable to exemptions under
Rules 504, 505, and 506. For a thorough history of the integration doctrine, see Darryl
Deaktor, Integration of Securities Offerings, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 465 (1979).
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ryone else, as they would be close in time and purpose. That means that
Chanute's purchases have to come under the same exemption as the sales
to everyone else. So if he and his friends come up with, let's say, $800,000,
you could only raise another $200,000 under Rule 504. And if we try to
use the intrastate exemption for our sales in Ohio, then you can't get any
money from Chanute or his friends. The integration doctrine will com-
bine the Ohio offering with the sales to Chanute and his friends in Illi-
nois and New York. That would kill the intrastate exemption. Even one
offer, or one sale, to an out-of-state person destroys that exemption."5 8
"Wait a minute," Orville interrupted, "suppose Octave and his
friends are qualified under the private offering exemption. We sell shares
to them. A short time later we sell shares under a totally different exemp-
tion to totally different people. What would be wrong with that? Every
sale would be proper under its own exemption. I can't see anyone com-
plaining about that."
"No one should complain," replied Horace, "because every person
has received exactly the protection accorded by the particular exemption
used. But we're discussing rules that seem to make no economic sense.
The integration doctrine really hurts small companies like yours that
need to raise money often and quickly to develop their product and to
stay in business. The SEC has ameliorated the problem a little bit by say-
ing that there is no integration between some offerings if they are more
than six months apart,59 but six months can be a long time for a company
to wait for more money."
"Suppose we ask Chanute and his friends for a loan, and then sell
$1 million in stock to others. Could we avoid integration?" asked Orville.
"We would stand a better chance because we're selling different
securities to different people, but I wouldn't be at all confident about
that," responded Horace. "Integration looks at a number of factors, and
one of them is whether the sales are part of a single plan of financing.
Debt is a security, just like equity. The SEC would probably look at the
sales to Chanute and his friends as part of the same financing plan as
sales to others. I tell you, fellows, I hate to be sounding so negative every
time you come up with an idea, but there's not much we can do with all
these rules."
58 See SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that
section 3(a) (11) exemption was lost when sale was made to one out-of-state resident);
SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86, 88 (D.N.H. 1958), aff'd, 276 F.2d 665
(1st Cir. 1960) ("No reason has been suggested why the broad language of section
3(a)(11) should exempt issues, where some allegedly sporadic and unintentional
sales have been made to non-residents . . ").
59 Rule 147 and the exemptions under Regulation D contain six-month safe
harbors. Offers or sales of securities made more than six months before or after a
Rule 147, Rule 504, Rule 505, or Rule 506 offering are not integrated with the
administrative exemption. There is no safe-harbor provision regarding integration of
statutory exemptions under section 3(a) (11) or section 4(2).
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"It looks like we're down to Chanute and his friends," Wilbur
interjected.
"Not quite," Horace replied. "We haven't discussed either Regulation
A60 or Rule 505.61 Under both exemptions you can raise $5 million. The
problem with Regulation A is that we've got to go through SEC review,
and we have no control over when the SEC will tell us we can go forward.
With Rule 505, you can't have more than thirty-five investors who are not
accredited investors."
"Are accredited investors the same as sophisticated investors?" Wil-
bur asked.
"Sometimes yes, sometimes no, which itself is a little strange. Accred-
ited investors are defined by who they are or how much money they make
or are worth. 62 Many accredited investors might be very unsophisticated,
especially when it comes to buying stocks. Considering that, it seems
strange to me that you don't have to give them a disclosure document.
63
Anyway, under Rule 505 you can sell to an unlimited number of accred-
ited investors, plus no more than thirty-five nonaccredited investors."
"Where do we find accredited investors?" Orville asked.
"I suppose the same place you'll find sophisticated ones. And that's
the problem. Once again, we've got an advertising and solicitation prob-
lem. If we go looking for accredited investors, we can't do so by general
means. We can only approach people with whom we've got some prior
relationship."6
4
60 Rules 251-263, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1999).
61 Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1999). Rule 505 is part of Regulation D and is
subject to Rules 501-508 of that regulation.
62 In general, accredited investors are defined in Rule 501(a), 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(a) (1999), as:
(1) certain banks and other institutional investors;
(2) regulated private business development companies;
(3) organizations with assets in excess of $5 million;
(4) directors, executive officers, or partners of issuer;
(5) a person whose net worth (along with spouse) exceeds $1 million;
(6) a person whose annual income exceeds $200,000, or whose joint income with
spouse exceeds $300,000; and
(7) trusts having in excess of $5 million in assets.
63 See Rule 502(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (1999) ("The issuer is not
required to furnish the specified information . . . to any accredited investor."). See also
Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promise of "Technological
Disintermediation"for Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1,
22-23 (1998) (absent empirical data regarding the quality of investment decisions by
accredited investors, "the emphasis on accredited investor status may be more an
accommodation to the capital raising desires of the small business community than as
a sound exercise in investor protection.").
64 See Patrick Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation, 38 EMORY L.J.
67, 107 (1989) (there has never been a favorable staff response on a general
solicitation question in the absence of a prior relationship with offerees); David B. H.
Martin, Jr. & L. Keith Parsons, The Preexisting Relationship Doctrine Under Regulation D: A
Rule Without Reason?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1031, 1044 (1988) ("The staffs
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"What about our customers?" Orville asked.
"I would have thought that would be okay, but that relationship
might not be enough," Horace replied. "I read one no-action letter in
which the SEC staff turned down a proposed letter to selected custom-
ers. 65 It seems that the relationship has got to be such that you know that
the person solicited has the experience to evaluate the merits of the offer-
ing and the financial ability to bear its risks.
'
"
6 6
"We don't know all that for very many of our customers," noted Wil-
bur. "What do other companies do to attract investors?"
"That's a good question." Horace replied. "In fact, I asked the same
thing of Lou Poston. He tells me that some companies ask his firm to use
their customer base for solicitation purposes. Apparently, that can be
done if the broker's customers are already known to the broker to be
accredited investors or qualified to purchase in a private offering.
6 7 I
asked him about us, and he told us that our offering is too low to interest
his firm-not enough commissions for the liability risks. I'm also told that
there are matching services that create two lists: one of prequalified
potential investors and the other of companies engaged in unregistered
offerings. 68 The matching services provide the investors with brief
descriptions of the companies. If the investors are interested in further
interpretive letters . . . indicate that the staff believes a preexisting relationship
between the issuer or its agents and offerees to be an almost absolute prerequisite to
avoiding general solicitation in a regulation D offering.").
65 The Tog Shop, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,192, at 88,139 (May 4, 1977).
66 Mineral Lands Research & Marketing Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 4,
1985), available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File.
67 See Arthur M. Borden, Esq., SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 6, 1978), available in
LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File. Prequalification is established through
questionnaires sent by brokerage firms to existing customers and others who might be
qualified investors. The SEC allows the development of a pool of potential offerees
through this method, provided that the questionnaires are not sent out in connection
with any pending offering. See H.B. Shaine & Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 31,
1987), available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File.
r8 In recent years the SEC has permitted the development of computer-based
matching services that seek to put together start-up and young companies with
prequalified investors who satisfy the accredited investor standards of Regulation D.
Under such services, both companies and potential investors pay annual fees to the
program manager, whose services are limited to providing basic offering information
to potential investors. Any followups are made solely by the interested investors. The
program coordinators refrain from any recommendations or advice regarding the
companies or investments. See, e.g., Texas Capital Network, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,857, at 78,542
(Feb. 23, 1994); Technology Capital Network, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1992
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 76,273, at 77,002 (June 5, 1992). Initially,
the SEC's concerns were such that it limited such services to nonprofit organizations,
such as universities. The Commission now also allows for-profit firms to offer such
services. IPONET, SEC No-Action Letter, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 77,252, at 77,270 (July 26, 1996) [hereinafter IPONET, SEC No-Action
Letter]. See Langevoort, supra note 63, for a review of the development of matching
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information, they request it from the service or from the company.69 We
could look into submitting your offering to a matching service, but that
could be a slow and unrewarding process. The matching service cannot
make any recommendations, and it can only provide a very brief descrip-
tion of the company. We'll be at the mercy of unknown investors who will
probably see your venture as fairly high risk. 70 Furthermore, we will have
no control over any aspects of timing. We need to approach people
quickly and directly. And that's what we can't do."
"Even if we could talk to a lot of people," Orville said, "we'd be lim-
ited to only thirty-five investors who are not accredited. That's a very low
number. Why thirty-five? Why not fifty, or a hundred?"
"Thirty-five is just a number that the SEC grabbed onto and has
stayed with. From a public protection standpoint, there's not much rea-
son to keep the number so low. 7 ' But there it is, and we can't go over it by
even one," replied Horace. 7 2
Silence ensued for a short while before Orville spoke. "Horace, we've
got to raise money and we've got to do it soon. We've probably already
violated some rules with the brochures we've been giving out, and it's
kind of you not to berate us for that. That's water under the bridge.
Maybe we can convince Octave and his friends to fund us for as close to
$1.5 million as they can get. We can probably get a few of our friends at
the Cash 73 to put in some money. If we come up short, we might have to
cut some corners. Right now we just need to go forward. If the SEC tells
services and the legal and investment questions raised by such nontraditional
processes.
69 See, e.g., IPONET, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 68, at 77,270. Prequalified
investors are given confidential passwords through which they may obtain Internet
access to brief descriptions of private offerings by companies that have agreed to be
listed in the service.
70 See Langevoort, supra note 63, at 19 (suggesting that the risk and uncertainty
inherent in start-up companies could result in sophisticated investors demanding the
involvement of brokers and investment analysts to create the level of comfort
necessary prior to making an investment decision, thus limiting the potential capital-
raising impact of computer-based matching and solicitation programs).
71 See C. Steven Bradford, Transaction Exemptions in the Securities Act of 1933: An
Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 591, 636-47 (1996) (arguing that economic analysis
does not support a strict limit on the number of nonaccredited investors, nor does it
support the distinctions in numbers of purchasers allowed in various exemptions, for
instance, Rules 504 and 505 and Regulation A).
72 Rule 508 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.508 (1999), creates a "substantial
compliance" defense with regard to some technical violations of the Regulation's
requirements. However, exceeding the maximum number of nonaccredited investors
is deemed a "significant" deviation for which the provision does not apply. See Rule
508(a) (2). The number could be exceeded only if the issuer reasonably believed that
there were no more than thirty-five nonaccredited investors.
73 The National Cash Register Company, known locally as "the Cash," was
founded in Dayton in 1890 and was the largest and most prosperous of all local
businesses.
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us that we've violated some rule, that's a risk we'll have to take. What's the
chance of them learning about us?"
"I really can't say," Horace responded. "They obviously can't keep up
with all the stock offerings made around the country. The advertisement
and brochures would be a problem if they find out, but they might never
hear about those.7 4 The form that we'll file with the SEC doesn't ask
whether there's been any general advertising or solicitation. 75 Let's do
the best we can and keep the number as low as possible. And let's not sell
any shares to anyone whom you've given a brochure to, or who is
responding to your advertisement, even if they come asking for shares.
We probably can't cure past problems, 76 but let's try to minimize them."
"Do you see any alternative, Wilbur?" Orville asked.
"I see it the way you do. Let's send a telegram to Octave and get
started."7
7
74 Horace may have wondered whether he had any obligations, ethical or
otherwise, to advise the SEC or prospective investors of possible securities laws
violations by his clients. The SEC has backed away from an earlier position, see SEC v.
National Student Mktg. Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,360, at 91,913 (Feb. 3, 1972), and does not insist upon attorney disclosure to it of
company violations. In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,847, at 84,145 (Feb. 28, 1981). The SEC's position is consistent with case law that
elevates the principle of confidentiality above concerns for full disclosure. See, e.g.,
Fortson v. Winstead, 961 F.2d 469, 475 (4th Cir. 1992) ("An omnipresent duty of
disclosure . . . would destroy incentives for clients to be forthcoming with their
attorneys . . ").
75 Form D must be filed for offerings under Rules 504, 505, and 506 no later
than fifteen days after the first sale of securities. Rule 503(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.503(a)
(1999). Failure to file Form D does not result in the loss of the exemption, but the
SEC may use that violation as a basis to seek to enjoin future offerings. Rule 507, 17
C.F.R. § 230.507 (1999).
76 There are no federal provisions for curing past violations. If the SEC learns of
violations during an offering, it is likely to issue a stop or cease-and-desist order
against any offering continuing for an indefinite period of time until the effect of the
violation has been eliminated. Rescission offers might also be permitted under
carefully controlled standards. See Alan Bromberg, Curing Securities Violations: Rescission
Offers and Other Techniques, 1J. CoP. L. 1 (1975). Most states provide for an offer of
rescission as a method of curing state securities law violations, following the format in
section 410(e) of the 1956 Uniform Securities Act. Problems faced in considering
cures of past violations are discussed in STUART R. COHN, SECURITIES COUNSELING FOR
NEW AND DEVELOPING COMPANIES ch. 17 (1999).
77 Horace did not raise the possibility of seeking a venture capital investment.
The advent of venture capital companies is a fairly recent phenomenon and did not
exist in the early years of the securities laws. Even if such companies existed at the
time, it is very unlikely that any of them would have been interested in the Wrights.
Untested products or services are rarely regarded with favor by venture capitalists,
who usually seek companies that have a good chance for a successful public offering
within several years. Venture capital financing is extremely difficult to obtain for most
new and developing companies. See I STEVEN C. ALBERTy, ADVISING SMALL BUSINESSES
ch. 14 (1989).
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Act II, Scene 1: The Bicycle Shop, Winter 1901 and Spring 1902
"It comes down to this, Wilbur, either Otto got it wrong or we did.
His figures and our results just don't match."
"You're right, brother," responded Wilbur from the rear of their
ever-more-crowded bicycle shop, "and I'm betting on us. Otto's tables
look right on paper, but not in the field."
Otto was Otto Lilienthal, the German scientist whose prestige
brought respectability to the heavier-than-air flying machine develop-
ment.78 Lilienthal was the first European scientist to take the possibility of
powered flight seriously enough to develop laboratory data. Lilienthal's
table of lifts provided by curved wings under varying wind conditions was
the foundation for all flight experiments by the Wrights and their Ameri-
can and European counterparts. Unfortunately, Lilienthal was killed in a
glider experiment in 1896. Subsequent to his death, no one devised a set
of calculations confirming or challenging his venerable table.
The Wrights' 1900 and 1901 glider flights, based entirely on Lilien-
thal's figures, were not wholly successful. Occasionally the two-winged
glider lifted effortlessly off the ground and rose quickly in the North Car-
olina shore breezes. But neither Orville nor Wilbur, who took turns pilot-
ing the glider from a prone position on the lower wing, could maintain
the glider's lift when wind direction or speed changed. Even in a constant
wind, there was more drag than Lilienthal's table indicated.
In 1900, the brothers were prepared to blame their own design and
inexperience. The 1900 glider was designed to be eighteen feet wide, but
the longest spars they could obtain from their supplier in Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, were only sixteen feet long. The two-foot difference concerned
them. But the 1901 glider met their exact specifications, and again the
experiments were marked more by failure than success. The brothers
realized that they could go no further in their efforts without discovering
the fault, either in their design or Lilienthal's table.
Winter 1901 and early Spring 1902 were devoted to lift calculations.
The brothers constructed a small wind tunnel powered by a fan and
homemade motor. Each evening, when the day's work of bicycle sales and
repairs was finished, the wind tunnel was placed on the repair table along
with dozens of small paper crafts of varying wing shapes and sizes. After
the brothers determined the ratios of their experimental winds and
weights to actual conditions, they began recording results. The results
were analyzed and compared to Lilienthal's table, and any inconsistencies
were confirmed. By Spring 1902, the brothers were convinced that their
figures were correct, although many differed substantially from Lilien-
thal's. The wind tunnel experiments also gave them additional knowl-
edge of wing design and manipulation.
78 See supra note 17.
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Funding had not been a problem for the 1901 glider experiments.
Profits from the bicycle shop and a small loan from the Dayton First
National Bank were sufficient to support the 1901 flight experiments. As
Summer 1902 approached, the brothers again faced the prospect of rais-
ing money for construction of their most ambitious gliders to date. Other
costs involved travel, hiring of assistants, purchase of recording instru-
ments, and the construction of hangars and a repair shop in North Caro-
lina. Once again they needed their attorney's help.
Act II, Scene 2: Planning Another Round of Financing, March 1902
When the brothers met with Horace Alexander in early March 1902,
they were confident that their revised calculations would lead to sus-
tained and controlled flight. They were, they believed, only one year away
from a motor-powered flight. But first their revised calculations and
designs needed testing in actual flight conditions.
"How much do you need this time around?" inquired Horace.
"We figure about $800,000." Orville laid a sheet in front of Horace
detailing expenses.
"That should be good news," Wilbur added. "We remember you tell-
ing us that anything up to $1 million had no problem."
"Well, yes and no," Horace replied. "Federal law gives us no problem.
We can raise up to $1 million under Rule 504 with no limitations on
number of purchasers and no costly disclosure obligations. 79 That's the
good news."
The brothers looked at each other. What shoe was going to drop
now? They had heard enough bad news from the securities laws.
"Trouble is, most states, including Ohio, won't let us do a Rule 504
offering without being registered at the state level.80 That means a full-
blown registration statement, merit review, time, delay, and costs. In fact,
the SEC recently amended Rule 504 to reinstate the old prohibition
against general solicitation and advertising unless the offering is state reg-
istered or sold under a state exemption that permits solicitation where
sales are made only to accredited investors."8 1
79 Rule 502(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (1999); Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. §
230.504 (1999).
80 The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (ULOE), the principal registration
exemption in a majority of the states (including Ohio), conflicts with Rule 504 in
several important respects. ULOE does not permit general advertising or solicitation,
imposes a cap of thirty-five nonaccredited investors, and imposes a suitability
requirement for sales to nonaccredited investors. A few states have linked their
exemptions to federal exemptions, including Rule 504, see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-
60(f) (West Supp. 1999), but these states are a distinct minority.
81 The SEC announced the amendment to Rule 504 on February 19, 1999.
Microcap Fraud: SEC Adopts Registration Reforms to Deter Fraud in Microcap Stocks, 31 Sec.
Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) 237 (Feb. 19, 1999). The reinstitution of a prohibition against
general solicitation and advertising, which had been eliminated from Rule 504 in
1992, was motivated by SEC staff concern that Rule 504 was being abused, especially
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"Why can't the federal government make its own rules and keep the
states out of it?" Orville cut in. "Who's in charge? I thought I remember
learning something about federal law being the supreme law of the land."
"You did learn something about that, Orville, but that doesn't always
apply. Congress could have preempted state law, but it chose not to.
Quite the contrary, state law was specifically preserved in the federal stat-
ute. 82 Congress recently made some exceptions by preempting state regis-
tration for some types of offerings. Unfortunately, those exceptions don't
give too much help to you or other small businesses. 83 So what we have is
two governments both regulating the same activity."
"What are states afraid of?" Orville asked.
"Well, they are basically afraid of unscrupulous promoters selling
junk stock. Remember, most states require some administrative review of
registered offerings, and administrators can deny registration to offerings
that do not meet their merit standards. But those standards only apply to
registered offerings. Administrators are not comfortable leaving the peo-
in the few states that did not require registration of offerings made pursuant to Rule
504. In New York, for example, a Rule 504 offering could be made by filing a State
Notice on Form M-1 1. In a scheme that the SEC staff called "pump and dump,"
securities were sold to persons who immediately placed the shares for resale with
broker-dealers. The broker-dealers engaged in cold-calling campaigns to resell the
securities, generating investor interest that caused the share price to rise. When the
initial block of shares was resold, the firms stopped their selling efforts. Without the
artificial stimulus, the share price dropped, causing substantial losses to the new set of
shareholders. The only parties making a profit were the initial purchasers and the
broker-dealer firms. The new amendments to Rule 504 prohibit general solicitation
or advertising unless the offering is registered in a state that requires presale delivery
of a disclosure document or the offering is made under an exemption for sales to
accredited investors only. Rule 502(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1999); Rule 504(b)(1),
17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1) (1999). If sales are to be made in New York, which has
neither a compatible issuer registration procedure nor an applicable accredited
investor exemption, the Rule 504 offering must be registered in at least one other
state that meets the Rule 504 conditions. Rule 504(b)(1)(ii), 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.504(b) (1) (ii) (1999). Otherwise, no general solicitation or advertising could
take place in New York.
82 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1994) (preserving the right of states to regulate securities
offerings).
83 The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), Pub. L.
No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3417, amended section 18 of the Securities Act of 1993 to
exempt from state registration and review any offering of a "covered security."
"Covered securities" are defined to include, inter alia, (1) securities issued pursuant
to Rule 506 of Regulation D; (2) securities issued to "qualified purchasers," a term not
yet defined by the SEC; and (3) securities listed or authorized to be listed on a
national securities exchange or NASDAQ's National Market System. For new and
smaller issuers, NSMIA's federal preemption is of little import. Nearly every state
already had in place exemptions regarding limited offerings that were analogous to
Rule 506. Nor would such companies likely qualify for listing their securities on an
exchange or NASDAQ's National Market System. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The
Impact of NSMIA on Small Issuers, 53 Bus. LAw. 575, 581 (1998) ("Notwithstanding such
rhetoric and the Act's apparently broad preemption of state laws, NSMIA itself has no
significant effect on the capital formation rules that govern small issuers.").
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ple of their state open to fraudulent securities schemes, so they prefer
very narrow registration exemptions. I can understand the concern, but I
think the scales have tipped too far, and many young companies have
great difficulty finding workable state exemptions."
"I can understand that," Orville replied, "but I can't see anyone com-
plaining about us. Maybe we should register the offering in Ohio and sell
as much as we can here."
"If you want to stay in Ohio," Horace responded, "and solicit all your
friends and others around here, we'll have to go through a state registra-
tion. Given the so-so results from your glider flights so far, I don't know
whether this offering would pass merit review muster. I would be sur-
prised if those Columbus bureaucrats would share your optimism about
your flying machine. In any event, the process will take months. And if
they don't approve the offering, we will have wasted a lot of time without
raising a wooden nickel. I doubt you want to take that chance."
"We can't afford to take that much time without the assurance of an
offering at the end," Orville replied. "So what do we do?"
"Maybe we can combine federal private offering and state limited
offering exemptions, which is basically what we've been doing so far with
Chanute and others," Horace replied.
"I'm afraid Octave has reached the end of his funding. Last year's
failures didn't sit well with him, nor has our criticism of his idol's famed
lift table," Wilbur stated.
"Let's look at it differently," Horace added. "Suppose we tried to
raise $800,000 by going to a number of states, say ten to fifteen. Each
state has an exemption for companies where the number of offerees or
purchasers is low. If we're careful, and keep the numbers as low as possi-
ble, we might be able to avoid the general solicitation problems in Rule
504 and the state exemptions. Do you fellows know people around the
country who could help us make contacts with prospective investors?"
Wilbur brightened at the suggestion. "We know a fair number of
people through the Aeronautical Society meetings. We'll be giving a talk
at the Society meeting in Chicago next month. We could easily say some-
thing about our need to raise some money."
"You could say it," Horace piped in, "but it would probably violate
the solicitation provisions. Anything you say to a general or mass meeting
about raising money will be construed as a general solicitation, and there
goes Rule 504 and the state exemptions.8 4 Some states may be more leni-
ent than others about what constitutes general solicitation,8 5 but we've
84 ULOE, based upon Regulation D's Rule 505, incorporates the Regulation's
prohibition against general advertising and general solicitation. Most other state
limited offering exemptions also prohibit advertising or solicitation.
'5 Curiously, Ohio is one of the few states that modifies the advertising limitation
by statute. See OHo REx,. CODE ANN. § 1707.03(0)(1)(c) (West Supp. 1999) ("No
advertisement . . . is used in connection with the sale, but the use of an offering
circular or other communication delivered by the issuer to selected individuals does
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also got to satisfy the SEC, which is especially touchy about what consti-
tutes solicitation.8 6 On the other hand, if you don't say anything in your
speech but talk individually to whomever you see at the meeting, and get
those people to agree to set up some individual meetings in their home
states with you and their friends who they know have some savvy and can
afford to make an investment, we might be able to manage. It's close to
the line, but it's the best we can do without registration.8 7 Meanwhile, I'll
start drafting a disclosure document we can give to prospective investors."
Act II, Scene 3: Kill Devil Hill, North Carolina, October 1902
Time after time the double-winged glider rose into the winds, flew
several hundred feet, and was brought to a controlled landing by Orville
or Wilbur. Improvements over the prior year's model gave them control
of both lift and drag, maneuverability to both left and right, and respon-
siveness to changing wind conditions. A major addition was the tail,
added in order to counterbalance resistance differences of the two wing-
tips. The glider flew so well that it was clear that the next step was motor-
powered flight. They already had a name for the future air machine-the
Wright Flyer.
Horace had arrived in North Carolina to witness the experiments
first hand. He wanted to be knowledgeable, as he would soon be drafting
the registration statement to finance the culminating flight experiments.
The patchwork fundraising efforts in prior years would not be sufficient
this time. The brothers no longer had the time to duplicate their enor-
mous personal efforts in prior months, traveling to twelve states to raise
money from aeroplane enthusiasts and their friends. Production and
experiment costs for the motored flights were estimated at $3 million.
Horace had considered a Regulation A offering, but he was quickly dis-
suaded when he realized that Regulation A offerings would nevertheless
not destroy this exemption."). Whether a speech delivered at a national conference
qualifies for the exemption is uncertain. The modification applies only to Ohio's
exemption where the number of purchasers does not exceed ten in a twelve-month
period. Ohio's ULOE exemption does not contain an analogous modification
provision. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.03(W).
86 See supra text accompanying notes 47-52 and 64-68.
87 Horace's advice, albeit practical under the circumstances, raises ethical issues.
He is counseling a course of action that could be in violation of both federal and state
securities laws. Horace might convince himself that his clients can stay on the proper
side of the law, but he knows, or should know, that there is a substantial risk that the
marketing of the securities will run afoul of solicitation prohibitions. See MODEL RuLEs
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1995) (forbidding lawyers from assisting a
client in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent). Unfortunately, the
straightjacket-like rules regarding exemptions can leave small companies with little
practical choice but to raise much-needed capital and keep their proverbial fingers
crossed that no legal problems arise. Lawyers advising such clients are inevitably
placed in ethically compromising circumstances.
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have to be registered in most states. 88 Moreover, Lou Poston at Daniel &
Sons had told him that his brokerage firm would not be interested in
participating in a rather small offering that was not federally registered.
8 9
Horace's principal fear was that he would have trouble convincing
state administrators, especially in Ohio, that the offering should pass state
merit review. Horace kept that concern to himself. Perhaps the Colum-
bus bureaucrats would be reasonable after all.
Act III, Scene 1: Prospectus Preparations, May 1903
Much of the prospectus for the Wright Flying Machine Company
remained unwritten as Spring 1903 rolled around. The primary disclo-
sure uncertainties involved the engine manufacture and the propeller
design. The Wrights prepared specifications calling for a gasoline engine
weighing no more than 180 pounds and capable of developing eight to
nine horsepower without vibration. To the brothers' dismay, not a single
engine manufacturer offered to build to those specifications. The rejec-
tions caused considerable delay. Eventually, the brothers had no alterna-
tive but to build the engine themselves.
Months of testing and refitting resulted in an engine that appeared
to meet their needs. The engine, however, was the least of their worries;
an engine could be tested within the workshop. The propeller could not
be tested, and no one had ever designed a propeller for an air machine.
The brothers' theories regarding propeller size and shape would not be
tested until the Wright Flyer was airborne. In fact, the brothers decided
upon two propellers-one each on the left and right sides of the engine.
The propellers would be driven by a single chain that looped in a figure
eight between them, causing the propellers to spin in opposite directions.
It was thought that opposite momentums would create a balance that
would not be achieved by a single propeller.
When Horace entered the bicycle shop on a sunny May afternoon,
he was greeted with the confident assertion by Wilbur that "we've done all
that we can. There's nothing left to do but build and fly."
"Nothing, that is, except to raise the money," Horace responded.
"That's what we've left to you and Lou," replied Orville. "How's the
prospectus coming along?"
88 Only a handful of states permit Regulation A offerings to be exempt from state
registration. Ohio is not one of those states. See infra note 112 and accormpanying
text.
89 Smaller offerings are of little interest to broker-dealer firms because they
generate too little commissions relative to the underwriting risks. Regulation A's $5
million limit is an impediment to using brokerage firms for such offerings. Moreover,
underwriters prefer registered offerings by companies because of the higher due
diligence that generally accompanies such offerings. The liability standards imposed
upon company management for registered offerings, plus the level of review given by
the SEC, offer a measure of confidence to underwriters that there are no lurking
disclosure problems for which they too might be liable.
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"Here's the final draft, boys. I want you to look it over carefully and
give me your comments. You'll have to sign it as directors of the com-
pany,90 and you'll be legally responsible for any mistakes.9 1 As soon as I
get it back from you, I'll file it in Washington, D.C., in Columbus, and in
the other states we've discussed."
"How long before we start selling stock?" Orville inquired.
"Not long. The federal statute says that we can start twenty days after
filing.9 2 We should be okay if Daniel & Sons comes through as they think
they can."
Within minutes after Horace left the shop, the brothers were poring
over the draft prospectus, smudging its pages with oil and dirt stains.
They were not too happy about the "Risk Factors" with which the prospec-
tus began.9 3 They were not sure that anyone would want to purchase
their stock after reading that section. Both Horace and Lou Poston had
advised the brothers not to get upset about those disclosures. According
to Lou, a prospectus was not important in selling shares. Very few of his
clients ever read them. The only thing that they wanted to know was their
brokers' recommendations. 94
The prospectus was returned to Horace with a few corrections, prin-
cipally dealing with description of the aeroplane's design. The registra-
tion statement was at the local printing company within a week, and
90 Registration statements must be signed by the issuer, the principal executive
officer or officers, the principal financial officer, the comptroller or principal
accounting officer, and the majority of the board of directors. See Securities Act of
1933 § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1994).
0" Section 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994), imposes liability upon each
registration statement signatory for any material misstatements or omissions, subject
to certain due diligence defenses and reliance upon expertised portions.
92 See id. § 77h(a) ("Except as hereinafter provided, the effective date of a
registration statement shall be the twentieth day after the filing thereof or such earlier
date as the Commission may determine . . . ."). This provision caused some personal
embarrassment in my first encounter with drafting a registration statement. On the
day that I was assigned responsibility within the law firm, the client called wanting to
know how long the SEC review process would take. After reading the statute, I advised
that we should be through the SEC within twenty days. I was not aware of the delaying
process then informally imposed and now codified in Rule 473, 17 C.F.R. § 230.473
(1999), by which the issuer waives the twenty-day period. The registration statement,
in fact, took approximately eleven months to become effective. The delay was due to
numerous technical and financial disclosure issues raised by the SEC through
comment letters. (The issuer was engaged in an overseas business and had not made a
profit for over five years.)
93 Item 503(c), Regulation S-K, applicable to all Form S-1 filings, requires
registrants to discuss "the most significant factors that make the offering speculative
or risky." See 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (1999). A similar requirement is imposed upon
registrants who utilize the Form SB-I.
9' Indeed, one of the principal ironies of the disclosure system is the
acknowledged fact that very few investors (other than institutional investors) read the
prospectus or understand what they have read. Issuers often believe that a prospectus
is a selling instrument, while their attorneys are more likely to regard disclosure as
part of the process of protecting clients against liability claims.
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shortly thereafter the Wrights had the "red herring" prospectus in
hand.9 5 Horace filed the prospectus with the SEC and with the state
securities divisions in Ohio and a dozen other states. The waiting period
began.
Act III, Scene 2: The State of Ohio Weighs In, July 1903
"What does this letter mean? We can't sell shares in Ohio?" Wilbur
queried his obviously disturbed lawyer.
Horace had dreaded this turn of events. Nearly two months had
passed since filing the registration statement, and now the Ohio Division
of Securities dealt the blow he had feared.
"I'm afraid it might be worse than that," he began. "Ohio is our
home state. If Ohio won't let us sell your shares, it's likely that all the
other states will follow suit."9 6
"This letter basically says that we've got a risky offer. Everyone knows
that. Why not let the investors decide for themselves?" Orville asked.
"I couldn't agree with you more," responded Horace. "Unfortu-
nately, these merit review laws are written very broadly, and state regula-
tors consider themselves on the side of the angels by protecting us from
our own folly."
The object of this unhappy discussion was lying on Horace's desk,
complete with the seal of the State of Ohio. It read:
" A registration statement consists of two parts. Part I is the portion that
eventually is circulated among potential investors and is known as the prospectus. Part
II contains information provided only to the SEC, for example, copies of material
contracts, costs of the offering, and reports on recent sales of unregistered securities.
A "red herring" is a draft prospectus after it has been filed with the SEC and it may be
used for solicitation purposes. The term is derived from the red lettering across the
cover page warning that the registration has not become effective and that the
prospectus information "will be amended or completed." 17 C.F.R. § 229.501 (b) (10)
(1999).
96 Until recent years, each state in which an offering was to be made conducted
its own review of the registration statement under its own standards, each would
respond separately to the registrant, and each might impose its own offering
conditions, such as escrowing of funds. Some states were generally regarded as more
difficult than others, but as a rule the issuer's home state was considered the most
important state in which to receive favorable review. If the home state denied a
registration statement, other states often followed suit. Recently, states have begun to
form regional groups for the review of registration statements. In 1997, the North
American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) developed the most
comprehensive coordinated review process, called "Coordinated Equity Review," for
certain types of smaller offerings. Coordinated through the Arizona Securities
Administrator, each offering has two "lead states" selected by the Coordinator. The
lead states collect comments from other state administrators and present a unified
response to the registrant. See State Program to Simplify Stock Sales for Mid-Sized Firms Sees
First Offering, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1150 (Aug. 15, 1997).
348 THE JOURNAL OF SMALL & EMERGING BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 3:315
Dear Sir:
After careful review of the registration statement filed with our office
on June 2, 1903, by the Wright Flying Machine Company, we have con-
cluded that the proposed offering of shares would be grossly unfair to the
citizens of the State of Ohio. For that reason, we must deny the application.
We base our conclusion on the untested nature of the company's prod-
uct. There is considerable doubt that a motor-powered air machine will suc-
ceed. Even if one or more test flights are successful, there is a complete lack
of evidence that the company will profit from the venture. As the prospectus
points out, there is no market for the sale of such air machines nor for their
commercial use. Given the enormous and obvious risks of flying in an air
machine, it is highly doubtful that registrant's invention will ever have any
commercial value. The prospectus makes reference to the machine's possible
use for military purposes, but you have presented no evidence of any govern-
ment contractual arrangement or negotiations.
Our obligation to the citizens of Ohio is to assure that share offerings
offer a respectable degree of possible profit when measured against the risk.
We must therefore conclude that the proposed offering cannot go forward in
this state.
Respectfully yours,
Derrick Cochrane
Inspector, Ohio Division of Securities
"What now?" Wilbur asked glumly, as the enormity of this refusal
sank in.
"We've got to fight this," Horace replied. "The three of us should
meet with this Derrick Cochrane as soon as possible. Can you go with me
to Columbus later this week if I can arrange an interview?"
The brothers knew that they had no choice. Silently, they both won-
dered why their own state was making it so difficult for them to succeed.
Act III, Scene 3: The Ohio Division of Securities, July 1903
Derrick Cochrane graduated from Ohio State Law School in 1902.
Not a top student in his class, he was thrilled to receive an offer from the
Ohio Division of Securities. His job as Inspector was low-paying but
offered the reward of public service. Derrick remembered well the advice
the Division Administrator gave him on his first day at work-be fair, but
when in doubt, err on the side of public protection. He had reviewed
over twenty registration statements during the past year, and the Wright
Flying Machine Company was his first denial. The denial had given him a
strange sense of satisfaction, as it confirmed his commitment to the pub-
lic interest. He was impressed by the Wright brothers' efforts. But, he told
himself, respect for inventiveness and daring did not translate into a
sound economic investment.
Following introductions, Horace went immediately to the point.
"Can you tell us, sir, exactly what you see as the problem with this offer-
ing? We certainly know that we are in uncharted waters, but so was
Thomas Edison."
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"Mr. Alexander, please don't compare your clients to Mr. Edison.
His invention had immediate and foreseeable economic consequences.
What we have here is entirely speculative. Indeed, it is speculation piled
upon speculation. Will your clients' machine get off the ground? History
is not on their side. Your prospectus notes the failures of eminent scien-
tists to devise an air machine that can carry a person. With all due
respect, neither of your clients graduated from high school. 9 7 Will they
succeed where trained scientists have failed? Apparently the Patent Office
doesn't think so."98
Derrick paused, clearly pleased with his response thus far to his first
confrontation with a rejected issuer and counsel. He continued, "Even if
your clients are able to get a machine off the ground, will the success be
worth anything? May I add, in answer to your question, that it is not my
job to convince you of my conclusions. It is your obligation to prove the
merits of this offering. I'm afraid that as much as I admire the ingenuity
and bravery of your clients, I must conclude that this share offering is not
a worthy economic investment. Perhaps you can convince administrators
in other states, but not here."
"But you well know," Horace interrupted, "that without Ohio's
approval we are not likely to be approved anywhere. This is so frustrating.
My clients are on the verge of making history, yet we are stymied from
raising the necessary funds."
"You're not stymied, as I see it," Derrick responded. "So far you've
managed to raise close to $2 million from wealthy backers in private
transactions."
"True," Horace replied, "but our prior investors have nothing left to
give us. Perhaps we could get small amounts from them, but we need $3
million. If we could find that money privately, of course we would. But we
don't have access to lots of well-to-do people. Without general solicita-
tion, we don't know where to look. And without registration, we can't
engage in widespread solicitation. That's our dilemma."
"I understand your dilemma, and I wish your clients well. But, the
concern of this office is safeguarding the public from unreasonable risk.
Your prospectus shows practically no hope of economic return. Even
assuming they can fly, are these air machines going to be sold? Who is
going to build them? And who will use them? How many people will be
willing to risk their life for a few minutes in the sky? Where is the profit in
97 Orville dropped out of high school, having found it not worth his time. Wilbur
did not complete his senior year due to his family's move from Richmond, Indiana to
Dayton. Neither brother applied to any college or university.
98 In 1903, the Wrights filed their first patent application. The application
covered a glider incorporating all of their developments to date, including a wing-
warping system and rudder. The U.S. Patent Office quickly rejected the application,
stating that the device was clearly "inoperative" and "incapable of performing its
intended function." CROUCH, supra note 1, at 246 (internal quotation marks
ommitted).
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this product? There isn't any, as far as I can see. At least not for the fore-
seeable future. I'm afraid, Mr. Alexander, that under our standards I have
no choice but to deny the application."
Orville could stay quiet no longer. "Sir, my brother and I don't know
anything about the law. We're just two folks trying to raise money for an
honest venture. Now, you talk about risks. Sure, we know those risks bet-
ter than anyone else. But they are put down in black and white-pages of
them. Mr. Alexander wrote so many of them that we began to wonder
whose side he was on. But he told us how important disclosure was, so we
understood. What I hear you saying now is that you, or the State of Ohio,
don't trust the judgment of the people who read this thing. I don't mean
to offend, but we've put so much effort into this project over the past four
years, we're on the brink of success, and we just need the funds to finance
this last act. It seems to me that our state government should be helping
us, not standing in the way."
"Mr. Wright," Derrick answered, "as I see it, this office is helping you.
Maybe you don't see it that way, but the most likely result we foresee is a
slew of mighty unhappy investors. They'll be at your doorstep, asking
where the money they gave you is, why you aren't paying any dividends,
and why the shares aren't appreciating in value. And when you have to
tell them that you don't have any dividends to pay, that you don't have
any profitable prospects, and that their money has been spent and is
gone, their next stop will be their lawyers' offices. As I see it, ourjob is to
protect all the citizens of this state, both promoters and investors. And I
think we do a pretty good job."
"Mr. Cochrane," Horace began, after a brief clearing of his throat, "I
can't help but point out that last year that fellow in Akron took $3 million
from the trusting citizens of that community and disappeared before any-
one realized that the certificates he was selling were entirely bogus. And I
remember a similar incident a few years ago in Cleveland involving a so-
called Ponzi scheme that again resulted in millions of lost dollars. 99
9 A Ponzi scheme is one that involves using new investor money to pay older
investors a promised interest or other economic return. Investors are not aware of this
circular use of invested funds and are falsely led to believe that the economic return is
being generated by company operations, which are usually minimal or nonexistent.
The term "Ponzi scheme" is derived from the notorious activities of Charles Ponzi in
Boston, beginning in December 1919. Ponzi offered investors a 50% return on short-
term notes, claiming that his company would earn huge amounts through the
international trading of postal coupons. Interest payments were made on a timely
basis, causing others to believe in the merits of the company. In fact, no business
operations were ever undertaken. Ponzi collected ovei $14 million within eight
months and made payments of approximately $9 million to his investors. The scheme
was finally exposed in August 1920 by a Boston newspaper. Ponzi was sentenced to
prison, from which he was paroled after three years. Following a second conviction
several years later for a real estate fraud, he was deported to Italy and was employed
by Mussolini in the Ministry of Finance. See In re Ponzi, 268 F. 997 (D. Mass. 1920); see
also Merill v. Abbott, 41 B.R. 985, 994 (D. Utah 1984);John Train, Mr. Ponzi and His
Scheme, HARv. MAG., May-June 1984, at 12.
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Please excuse me for saying so, but it seems to me that your office ought
to be putting its energies and resources into discovering and stopping
fraudulent schemes instead of preventing hard-working entrepreneurs
from raising money for honest ventures."
"Mr. Alexander, our office cannot police the world. When promoters
of fraud work outside the law, we often do not learn about that until it's
too late."
"That is my point, sir," Horace replied. "Because fraudulent offerings
never get filed, the registration process does not protect people against
such nefarious schemes. You can't stop the fraud artists who simply
ignore your office and the law. It is only the law-abiding entrepreneurs
like my clients who make your filings, and then they are required to sat-
isfy all kinds of technical requirements and merit review judgments. The
majesty of the law is imposed on the wrong people. Something doesn't
seem right with all this. I believe that your attention should be focused on
prosecuting those who deliberately or wantonly take advantage of others.
If you are dealing with honest, good faith promoters, why not just ask
whether they have given full disclosure to potential investors? If they
have, let the investors decide whether or not to buy their shares."
"I appreciate your eloquence, Mr. Alexander," answered Derrick
Cochrane coolly, "but you are asking this office to rewrite the laws, and of
course we cannot do that. Nor should we. Simply because fraudulent
schemes occur outside our control does not justify our office permitting
all offerings to be inflicted on the citizens of this state, however well-
meaning the promoters may be."
Horace realized that there was no chance of moving Derrick Coch-
rane off his opinion. He seemed almost to enjoy this opportunity to slam
the door on the Wrights' fledgling company. Horace asked as politely as
possible if Mr. Cochrane's letter also represented the view of the Division
Administrator.
"I can assure you, sir, that I have the Administrator's full support on
this matter," Derrick stiffly replied. "Of course, you have the right to
appeal, but I seriously doubt that you will find a court of law prepared to
overturn our decision."1 00
The mood was somber in the train car back to Dayton. Wilbur and
Orville pressed Horace for his ideas on the next course of action.
"My opinion," Horace replied, "is that we concentrate on New York.
The offering has been cleared there. 10 1 Lou tells me that his office has
100 Denials by state administrators are rarely appealed. The breadth of authority
granted to administrators supports wide discretion in their decision-making.
Generally, companies seek to work out problems with states through such measures as
agreeing to escrowing of funds and increased conditions on promoters' equity and
control. If the state objection goes to the heart of the offering's viability, there is little
that can be done to reduce that concern.
101 New York, as well as the District of Columbia, generally does not require
issuer registration but instead relies upon broker-dealer registration for any offering
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good contacts in that state. Whether we can sell most of the $3 million
there is the big question. Whatever Lou's office can't sell, we can try to
sell ourselves under state exemptions in Ohio and elsewhere."
"Let's get started and find out. Time is really short now," Orville
interjected.
"I wish we could get started, but we're still waiting for SEC approval,"
Horace replied. 10 2
"Why haven't we got federal approval yet?" Wilbur inquired. 'You
told us it would take only twenty days. It's been almost two months."
"I never should have said anything about twenty days," Horace admit-
ted. "I read the statute too literally. I didn't realize the SEC has its ways
around that one.10 3 We're basically at their mercy when it comes to
timing."
"So you're saying that we don't have any timetable?" asked Wilbur.
"I'll send a telegram to the SEC to see where things stand. We just
answered that one letter we got from them three weeks ago.1 0 4 It asked us
everything from how you develop your engineering data to how a flying
machine will ever make a profit. Plus all that supplemental information
they asked for-all those experimental notations you fellows have been
making. I hope they'll be satisfied and let us move ahead now. I'll send
them a telegram to try to hurry things along."
made within the state. New York requires issuer registration only for real estate
syndication offerings (which are broadly defined) and intrastate offerings that utilize
the federal intrastate offering exemption. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 352-e, 359-ff
(McKinney 1996).
102 Although it is common to speak of "SEC approval" in referring to the time at
which the SEC staff declares the registration statement effective, the SEC does not
approve (or disapprove) of any offering (as the cover page of every prospectus is
required to state). The SEC staff's decision to permit a registration statement to
become effective simply reflects the fact that the staff has no further comments or
requests for information regarding the filing.
'0' See supra note 92.
104 First-time issuers receive careful review of the draft registration statements by
the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance. Following several weeks of review, the
Commission staff generally sends a comment letter (in common parlance, sometimes
referred to as a "deficiency letter") to the registrant advising it of the disclosure
matters that, in the staffs opinion, should be amended, added, or deleted, and often
asking for supplemental information from the registrant to support statements made
in the registration statement. A second, amended registration statement is
subsequently filed, reflecting changes in accordance with the SEC comments. It is not
uncommon for first-time issuers to receive a deficiency letter even as to amended
registration statements. Indeed, the first registration statement that I worked on as a
young associate in a law firm generated five such letters, partly as a result of my own
inexperience and partly because the company was engaged in an unprofitable foreign
business for which the SEC staff demanded considerable supplemental information.
The SEC's guidelines for deficiency letters are codified in 17 C.F.R. § 202.3(a)
(1999).
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"Please do that, Horace," Orville said. "If we don't leave soon for
North Carolina, we'll miss the season. Another year could mean we've
lost the lead on the French and Germans."'10 5
"Boys, I'll do what I can," Horace replied, none too confidently.
Epilogue: Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, December 1903
The winds were calm on this 14th day of December, too calm in fact
to permit a start from level ground. The Flyer was towed a quarter of a
mile to the top of Kill Devil Hill. The truck that would propel the craft to
its rolling start, and the rails along which the craft would run, were placed
downward along the hill. Wilbur won the coin toss and climbed onto the
lower wing. Orville spun the right propeller and cranked the motor,
which started immediately. As the truck moved downhill, pushing the
craft with it, Orville ran along the side, steadying the wings. After thirty-
five to forty feet, the restraining wire to the truck was released and the
Wright Flyer took flight. Wilbur turned the machine upwards too quickly.
The Flyer stalled and sunk to the ground, cracking one of the skids and
several other parts. The first flight had lasted 3.5 seconds. Indeed, it
could not technically be considered a flight, as it landed at the base of the
hill, lower than the point at which it took off.
Repairs and calm winds kept the brothers from further attempts for
several days. The calm ended on December 17. Ice was scattered in pools
along the ground, the sky was grey, and winds were gusting from the
north stronger than Orville and Wilbur would have liked. They waited in
vain several hours for the winds to slacken. Their patience gone and
eagerness rising, the brothers decided to attempt another flight. The
Flyer was wheeled out of its shed. The sixty-foot starting track was laid
along the level ground and the craft positioned upon the track, facing
into the wind. At 10:35 a.m., Orville (it was now his turn) hoisted himself
onto the craft and laid down across the lower wing, his hips resting in a
cradle that contained the control mechanisms. Wilbur cranked the
engine, and the truck started forward, pulling the Flyer along. Wilbur ran
alongside, holding a wing to keep the craft balanced. Forty feet down the
track, the Wright Flyer rose slowly and climbed to a height of approxi-
mately ten feet. Orville had difficulty controlling the craft in the strong
winds. After a roller coaster up-and-down flight of twelve seconds, cover-
ing 120 feet, the craft dropped abruptly to the ground. It was not grace-
ful, but it was historic. An hour later, Wilbur duplicated the feat with a
flight of 175 feet. The brothers completed four flights that day and
looked forward to longer and higher flights in days to come. Unfortu-
nately, while the craft was standing near its shed at day's end, a gust of
'05 The brothers were well aware of other flight experimenters and that they
were part of an unofficial race to be the first to fly an engine-powered machine. They
once admonished Chanute for his wide distribution, including overseas, of the text of
a talk given by Wilbur in 1901 in Chicago. CROUCH, supra note 1, at 230.
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wind struck it sidewise, turning it over several times. The damages were
too extensive to be repaired and the first Wright Flyer never flew again.
The brothers returned to Dayton shortly thereafter. They were never to
return to Kitty Hawk. Future flights were conducted in the Dayton area
and elsewhere.
And what of the financing problems? Fortunately, that element of
this historical account was fictional. But what if a need for funds had
existed? The story might well have ended differently. Having been
rejected on merit grounds from offering shares in Ohio and other mid-
western states, the Wrights would have turned to New York as their only
hope. Yet they could not have begun an offering in New York until the
registration statement became effective with the SEC. Delays at the fed-
eral level could be easily conjectured. The initial SEC comment letter had
asked for backup engineering data and more detailed explanation of the
profit-making capability of a flying machine. The information supplied
might not have satisfied the examiners. The SEC could be expected to be
cautious, given the novelty of the venture and the lack of clear profitabil-
ity. A second comment letter could well have resulted. It might have
required the prospectus to delete all references to potential government
contracts unless such contracts were in fact being negotiated. It might
have required a much more complete description of potential uses of a
flying machine for profit-making purposes. It might have required the
prospectus to describe what additional funding might be available if the
company could not generate revenues. These and other inquiries would
all be in the name of full disclosure, although it would be apparent that
the full disclosure gambit was an indirect form of merit review. The SEC
might not be able to foreclose a risky offering, but it could certainly delay
it and cause the promoters to jump through innumerable hoops. Multi-
ple SEC comment letters, and the time necessary to gather responsive
information, might have stalled the offering beyond the time that the
Wrights could leave for North Carolina. They were prepared to brave the
winds and cold of November and December, but not the icy conditions of
January through March. The 1903 experiments might have been post-
poned. What would have been the effect of the delay? Samuel Langley
was working diligently on flight experiments, 10 6 as were French and Ger-
man inventors experimenting with power-driven craft. The world was on
106 In 1896, Samuel P. Langley built a power-driven glider that flew over the
Potomac River near Washington, D.C. The flight, which lasted approximately a
minute and a half, marked the first time that a power-driven, heavier-than-air
machine stayed in the air for more than a few seconds. Langley was the Secretary of
the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, and his success sparked enormous
interest in the possibility of flight. (The Smithsonian provided the Wrights with their
initial books and pamphlets describing flight experiments and glider construction,
responding to a request from Wilbur in June 1899, as the brothers were beginning the
development process.) Langley continued his work on mechanical flight, urged on by
interest from the War Department. Two 56-foot machines were built in 1903, but both
failed.
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the verge of motor-powered flight, but it might not have been the Wright
brothers who first rose into the air to become icons of American history.
III. IMPEDIMENTS TO CAPITAL FUNDING
The Wright brothers saga, albeit fictionalized, illustrates the regula-
tory limitations that severely inhibit the capital-raising prospects of small
and start-up companies. One must question whether the efforts of count-
less entrepreneurs, inventors, and dreamers who struggle to find outlets
and financing to support their ingenuity are in fact hindered, or even
defeated, by the securities laws. Has the concern for investor protection
led to a regulatory regime in which both tangible and intangible costs
have become too high? Statistics are not available regarding the number
of start-up or near start-up companies that fail for lack of an ability to
raise adequate capital, or whether such failures are in part due to the
legal strictures of raising capital. What we do know is that the securities
laws do not facilitate capital funding for smaller companies. Despite the
growth of state- and SEC-authorized exemptions, legislative policy contin-
ues to reflect the fundamental view that registration exemptions are
exceptional and not easily attainable.
A history of more than sixty years of securities regulation should give
an indication of which of our regulatory processes are most significant.
Viewed from that perspective, one must question whether the registration
requirement, the heart of both federal and state securities legislation,
should remain the primary investor protection process. Put another way,
if disclosure is the sine qua non of the securities laws, it might be prefera-
ble to reduce emphasis upon registration, expand exemption possibili-
ties, and concentrate on measures that promote full disclosure and
sanction disclosure violations.
The menu of registration exemptions is tantalizing but, upon close
examination, seriously flawed. Securities law problems faced by entrepre-
neurs seeking to utilize such exemptions fall into the following principal
areas:
A. Limitations on Manner of Offering
Every federal exemption creates substantial marketing problems.
Rule 504 prohibits general solicitation and advertising unless the offering
is registered under state law or is offered under a state exemption that
allows general solicitation and advertising for offerings limited to accred-
ited investors.10 7 In addition to these state law considerations, Rule 504's
ceiling is too low. Limiting developing companies to no more than $1
million every twelve months is a serious restraint for many start-ups, espe-
cially in technology and health areas, where high personnel and research
costs are involved.
107 See supra note 39.
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Although the intrastate exemption has the advantage of allowing
solicitation and advertising within the state in which the offering is made,
this exemption is riddled with technical limitations. The exemption is lost
even if one out-of-state person is offered the security, regardless of the
company's good faith. The offer alone ruins the exemption. Indeed, it
does not matter whether the out-of-state offeree purchases the security.
The exemption is also lost if prior or subsequent investments by out-of-
state investors are deemed integrated into the state offering (the problem
that the Wright brothers faced with their sales to Octave Chanute). More-
over, the ambiguous statutory standards of section 3(a) (11) and the more
objectively stated criteria of Rule 147 both demand a truly localized busi-
ness. Any significant degree of out-of-state business could ruin the exemp-
tion, a limitation that is archaic in light of the increasingly
interconnected national and global economies. One might be more sym-
pathetic to the exemption's limitations if there were merit to the notions
that local investors know management and understand the local business,
and that local enforcement can quickly discover and respond to offering
violations. But those concepts make sense only in the smallest communi-
ties. When applied in states with millions of dispersed citizens ranging
over hundreds of miles, concepts based upon local knowledge and con-
trol are no longer justifiable. At a minimum, consideration should be
given to creating a regional exemption covering multiple states1°8 or per-
mitting some percentage leeway for out-of-state investors.
The private offering exemption qualifications for offerees and pur-
chasers limit the pool of potential investors and, when coupled with the
stringent limitation against advertising and solicitation,10 9 make it
extremely difficult for start-up companies to find a sufficient number of
investors to meet their capital requirements. The principal hope for
many young enterprises is to attract the interest of either a well-heeled
angel 110 or a venture capital company. In that case, only one investor
108 This suggestion was one of several developed by the SEC's 1996 Task Force
on Disclosure Simplification (available on the SEC's Internet web site <http://www.
sec.gov/rules/propridx.htm)>. That suggestion was not adopted, nor was any other
affecting the intrastate exemption. The only exemption reforms adopted from the
Task Force report involved elimination of relatively insignificant reporting forms. See
Phase Two Recommendations of Task Force on Disclosure Simplification, 62 Fed.
Reg. 39,755 (1997).
109 See supra notes 47-48, 50-52, 64, 67-68 and accompanying text.
110 The term "angel" has become the securities industry appellation for an
individual who is a significant financial backer of a young enterprise, usually in lieu of
a venture capital company. Angel financing is more common and larger in total
cumulative amounts than funding by venture capital companies, as many capital-
seeking enterprises find it easier, quicker, and cheaper to solicit and contract with
wealthy individuals rather than undertake the extensive and often frustrating search
for a willing venture capital firm. Angels are not on every street corner (real or
ethereal), but there is a growing body of wealthy entrepreneurs willing to invest in
start-ups in the hopes of finding the next big market attraction, and many law firms
and accounting firms are able to provide clients with names and ready access to such
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need be found, albeit an investor that brings with it a set of demands that
substantially affect management and long-term goals. Venture capital is a
welcome source of funding in some instances, but many start-ups never
make it to first-round consideration. Companies outside of the current
"hot" field stand little hope of consideration. What is "hot" varies over
time. Computer technology, medical care, and high-tech communica-
tions have been venture capital darlings in the recent past. But being in
the right field is not enough. Unless the prospects are bright for an Initial
Public Offering (IPO) within a few years, which means rapid and substan-
tial revenue growth, even the most well-managed companies will not get
their feet in an angel's or venture capitalist's door. Without a prospect for
a major investor, companies hoping to use the private offering exemption
often will be substantially hampered by unbending requirements regard-
ing offering methods and offeree and purchaser qualifications.
The Regulation A exemption relaxes some of the solicitation limita-
tions and imposes no restrictions on offerees or purchasers. Yet Regula-
tion A is not amenable to many start-up or developing situations. The
monetary limit of $5 million is too low in many instances. The modified
registration process is both costly and time-consuming and could result in
delays during periods that companies have substantial fiscal needs. The
"test-the-waters" provisions are a major step in the right direction,"' but
so far only a relatively few states permit solicitation in the absence of a
locally filed registration statement.' 12 Indeed, most states do not exempt
Regulation A offerings from state registration. Thus, companies will need
individuals. See generally, Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business
Capital Barrier?, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 57, 62 (1998) (noting the role of
business angels as an informal source of capital which fills a "gap between start-up
funds and other capital sources"); Rich Karlgaard, Manager's Journal: Dollars from
Heaven, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1998, at A22 (noting the rise in and advantage of angel
financing compared to venture capital financing).
"I Rule 254, 17 C.F.R. § 230.254 (1999). Issuers may solicit expressions of
interest before filing the offering statement under the following conditions: (a) a
written solicitation of interest document must be delivered to prospective investors
before any oral communication, (b) no money or commitment may be accepted, and
(c) no sales can be made until qualification of the offering and not until at least
twenty days after delivery or publication of the solicitation of interest document. The
SEC's adoption of the "test-the-waters" concept in 1992 was a major turnaround from
prior no-solicitation positions.
112 Arizona, ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 14-4-141 (1999); Colorado, Colo. Div. Sec.
Rules § 51-3.13A, IA Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 13,430C, at 9,406 (1999); Indiana,
IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 710, r. 1-13-7 (1999); Kansas, KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 81-5-12;
Massachusetts, MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 950, § 14.402(k) (1999); North Dakota, N.D.
CENT. CODE § 10-04-06 (1999); Oregon, OR. ADMIN. R. 441-35-045 (1999);
Pennsylvania, Availability of Discretionary Exemptive Order, 3 Blue Sky L. Rep.
(CCH) 48,684J, at 43,689-106 (1999); Utah, UTAH ADMIN. CODE R164-14-21s (1999);
Virginia, VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-40-70 (1999); Vermont, Exemption Order, 3A Blue Sky
L. Rep. 58,430, at 51,613 (1999); Washington, Washington State Department of
Financial Institutions-Securities Division, Testing the Waters: Solicitation of Interest
(visited Oct. 8, 1999) <http://www.wa.gov/dfi/ securities/ttw.html>; Wisconsin, Wis.
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to go through state registration if they cannot fit the offering into a state
exemption.
B. Integration with Other Offerings
Developing companies frequently need capital input. The hiring of
research and development personnel, the purchase of equipment, the
need for expanding facilities, and other capital demands often arise with
little advance warning. Because developing companies generally have lit-
tle or no revenue from operations, they are funded solely by additional
debt or equity inputs. Debt financing might be possible, and loans from
major institutions might not be deemed securities. However, many
smaller companies cannot finance more than a small portion of their
needs from traditional lending sources. Consequently, the securities mar-
ket is often the only source for additional capital. But when a company
goes back to the securities market on multiple occasions, it runs the sub-
stantial risk of invoking the integration doctrine.
The basis of integration is that a single offering should fit within a
single exemption. An issuer should not split a single offering into smaller
parts that fit particular registration exemptions only on a piecemeal basis.
The integration doctrine is problematic on two fundamental points. First,
the premise that an offering cannot be split into discrete parts is related
only to form, rather than substance. The inquiry for any offering should
be whether the prospective investor was afforded adequate protections
against an abusive offering. Integration does not address that issue. It sim-
ply is a formalistic barrier to capital raising.
To use the Wright brothers scenario as an example, if the Wrights
had obtained funding from Octave Chanute and several other investors,
all of whom qualified as knowledgeable investors under the private offer-
ing exemption, why should the Wrights have been precluded from engag-
ing in a concurrent offering to other investors under Rule 504? If all
prospective investors are accorded whatever safeguards a particular
exemption requires, the integration doctrine adds nothing to the goal of
investor protection.
A second fundamental problem with the integration doctrine is the
difficulty of ascertaining a single offering.' 13 The five-part test developed
by the SEC 1 14 leaves much room for differing interpretations. When a
developing company raises money to finance research efforts, and then
ADMIN. CODE § 2.027 (1999); Wyoming, Wyo. Sec. Div. Reg. ch. 6, § 2(f), 3A Blue Sky
L. Rep. 1 66,433 (1999).
113 See Cheryl L. Wade, The Integration of Securities Offerings: A Proposed Formula
That Fosters the Policies of Securities Regulation, 25 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 199, 200 (1994)
("[B]ecause the test lacks clarity, it is frequently impossible to predict whether an
issuer's offerings will be integrated.") (footnote omitted). Professor Wade
recommends that the integration doctrine not be applied if the issuer can
demonstrate a rational business purpose for making the separate offerings.
114 See supra note 57.
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does the same several months or even many months later, are the two
fundraising efforts part of a "single plan of financing"? What is deemed a
"plan" for these purposes? Developing companies inevitably require
repetitive capital inputs. Does the inevitability element cause multiple
offerings to be part of a "single plan of financing" or to be offerings
"made for the same general purpose"? The lack of a ready answer to this
question creates enormous risk for companies who are faced with the
Hobson's choice of risking a violation of the securities laws or foregoing
much-needed capital funding.115
The integration rules are ameliorated to some extent by the six-
month safe harbors created for Rule 147116 and Regulation D1 1 7 offer-
ings. Regulation A also provides fairly clear safe-harbor standards.' 1 8
However, the six-month bright-line tests create their own set of problems.
For one, the measuring point for the time period starts only with the
completion of the prior offering, which raises interpretive questions as to
when a prior offering (as opposed to sales) has ended. Indeed, when
smaller companies engage in financing efforts, they might do so in a
manner that makes an offering's "completion" date somewhat uncertain,
thus further exacerbating planning efforts. The six-month time period is
also problematic. Although there is no explicit presumption in any SEC
rule that offerings within six months are integrated, the creation of a
fixed-boundary date could cause courts and counsel to treat such offer-
ings as presumptively integrated unless clearly proven otherwise. Finally,
the six-month cleansing period may be far too long for many young com-
panies to wait before they can raise additional capital.
C. Restrictions on Solicitation
No limitation characterizes the phobia of securities regulators more
than the prohibitions against general advertising and solicitation.' 1 9
Developed in the early history of the private offering exemption 120 and
codified in regulation D, 121 the proscription against broad-based efforts
to find potential investors has remained a bulwark of federal and state
securities laws.
As the antisolicitation rules are applied, companies engaged in pri-
vate offerings under section 4(2) or Rule 506, Rule 505 offerings, or any
15 The problem also creates ethical dilemmas for companies' counsel. See supra
note 87.
16 Rule 147(b) (2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(b) (2) (1999).
117 Rule 502(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1999).
s Rule 251(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c) (1999).
119 For a critique of the SEC's antisolicitation rules, see Stuart R. Cohn, Securities
Markets for Small Issuers: The Barrier of Federal Solicitation and Advertising Prohibitions, 38
U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1986); Daugherty, supra note 64, at 67.
120 See supra note 52.
121 Rule 502(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1999) ("[N]either the issuer nor any
person acting on its behalf shall offer or sell the securities by any form of general
solicitation or general advertising . . ").
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of a wide variety of offerings under state exemptions, must refrain from
advertising the fact of the offering to the general public or any segment
thereof. They cannot utilize even tombstone-like notices that do no more
than invite interested persons to make further inquiry and receive an
offering document. Even the most innocuous notice of a pending offer-
ing is likely to be deemed an "offer."
It is difficult to understand what harm results from a brief notice
advising that a company is offering its securities and inviting inquiries
from interested persons. If persons who respond are given full disclosure
before any investment decision is made, there appears to be no public
policy basis for denying the company the opportunity to attract such per-
sons. If the concern is that advertisements and notices can "pre-sell"
investors regardless of ultimate disclosures, the appropriate response is
not to ban legitimate efforts to attract potential investors but to regulate
the quality of disclosures that may be made in a solicitation setting. 122
The second arrow in the antisolicitation bow relates to interaction
with potential investors. Person-to-person contact is extremely important
to smaller companies because they have neither the name recognition
nor the established goodwill to draw on a ready pool of potential inves-
tors. Yet personal solicitation is prohibited except in the narrow circum-
stances where the company or its agents have a prior relationship with the
individual being solicited. 123 Further, the prior relationship must predate
the current offering and be sufficient to allow the company or its agent to
know that the person being solicited can understand the merits of the
offering and afford the economic risk. 124 Without a major benefactor or a
willing venture-capital partner, developing companies have little chance
to attract investors without running afoul of the solicitation restraints.
The SEC cracked open the antisolicitation door for issuers who employ
broker-dealers. 125 However, offerings by small companies usually are too
small or limited in scope to interest even local or regional broker-dealers.
122 A recent example of the SEC's form-over-substance stance is found in Mobile
Biopsy, LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,613, at 76,157 (Aug. 11, 1999). In order to raise funds for medical equipment, an
LLC proposed mailing circulars to local surgeons and radiologists who would be
expected to be knowledgeable about the services and potential users. Any potentially
interested investors would return a card indicating their interest, and they would then
be provided a complete disclosure document. The offering was intended to comply
with Rule 506 of Regulation D. However, SEC staff denied the no-action request,
stating that the initial mailing would be a prohibited "general solicitation" under Rule
502(c). It is difficult to understand why the rule-oriented formalism should continue
to prevail over examination of the quality of disclosure and investor understanding.
123 See supra note 64.
124 See supra note 66.
125 Broker-dealers are permitted to solicit from lists of prequalified customers. See
E.F. Hutton & Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 3, 1985), available in LEXIS 2917;
Arthur M. Borden, Esq., SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 6, 1978), available in LEXIS 2001.
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IV. REFORM WITH AN EYE ON INVESTOR PROTECTION
Any effort to ameliorate offering conditions for small and developing
companies must include the consideration of investor protection. But
what precise protections are necessary for investors? Viewing the federal
and state registration processes in their most essential aspects, what inves-
tor protection is afforded by policies that promote registration of securi-
ties offerings? Peeling away the layers of registration requirements reveals
two fundamental protective elements. These elements are noted by the
SEC in its "Aircraft Carrier" Release, 126 namely that the registration sys-
tem "provides investors with the dual benefits of: full and fair disclosure
(or effective remedies if there is faulty disclosure), and freely tradable
securities." 127 This statement is revealing. The SEC finds two principal
benefits from registration-disclosure and the ability to resell securities.
For investors willing to acquire restricted, rather than freely tradable,
securities, 128 the benefit of full disclosure backed by sanctions can be
achieved as effectively through exemption requirements as through regis-
tration. 129 Although registration involves SEC review, no amount of
administrative review can guarantee compliance with disclosure require-
ments. If, as the SEC indicates, disclosure is the principal element in a
registration scheme, and if disclosure can be provided effectively in an
exempt offering, there is little reason other than antipathy to the exemp-
tion process to load exemptions with numerous additional and often
highly technical elements.
One may agree with Professor Jonathan Macey that the SEC has dis-
rupted the capital formation process through inefficient regulations with-
out necessarily accepting his conclusion that the SEC suffers from
126 Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7606A,
Exchange Act Release No. 40632A, [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
86,108, at 81,461-3 (Nov. 13, 1998).
127 Id. 86,108, at 81,467.
128 See, for example, Rule 502(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (1999), which limits
the resale of securities acquired in Rule 505 or Rule 506 exemptions. Such securities,
along with securities acquired in a private offering, are deemed "restricted" securities
and may be resold in accordance with Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1999).
129 Registered offerings subject the company, its directors, principal officers, and
certain others to section 11 liability, a liability that is strictly applied against the issuer
and turns on the defense of due diligence for the individual defendants. See Escott v.
Barchris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Disclosure violations
in exempt offerings are not subject to section 11 and can be tried only under the
more limited provisions of section 12(2) of the 1933 Act and Rule 10b-5 under the
1934 Securities Exchange Act. It may therefore be argued that disclosure cannot be as
effectively mandated in exempt offerings because of the different and more
conditioned sanctions. The difference may be more one of form than substance. The
lack of due diligence that dooms a section 11 defendant may not be much different
from "recklessness" that likewise undermines the Rule 10b-5 defendant. Similarly, in
smaller companies many of the principal officers and directors are likely to be directly
involved in the selling process, thus subjecting themselves to liability under section
12(2) as sellers or under Rule 10b-5 as primary violators.
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obsolescence, agency imperialism, and capture by special interest
groups.1 30 None of the examples cited by Professor Macey demonstrating
the SEC's supposed obsolescence relate to initial capital formation,
except for his discussion of the efforts to limit trading in penny stocks.1 3 1
Penny stock trading is a specialized area that has witnessed enormous
abuse in both the primary and secondary markets. I do not agree that the
SEC's lack of development of effective registration exemptions is a result
of imperialistic desires over the capital market or a surrender to securities
professionals who benefit from a mandated registration process. In my
judgment, the failure has simpler roots.
The Commission is the repository of countless investor complaints
stemming from failed (and often unregistered) investments. Its Enforce-
ment Division is incapable of pursuing more than a small fraction of
potential 1933 Act violations. The agency was born with a heritage
demanding concern for the individual investor. The collective weight of
these factors has lead to a systemic, inherent, and structural bias against
lowering the bar for registration.
When the Commission does lower the bar, it does so only by inches.
Witness Rule 504,132 the most liberal of all federal exemptions. It is lim-
ited to $1 million, 133 a figure far too low to accommodate many of today's
technical start-up companies. Witness also the amendment to Regulation
A authorizing issuers to "test the waters" before committing to the time
and expense of a Regulation A offering.1 34 The SEC should have known
when the concept was adopted that it was of little practical merit because
few states would permit such solicitation in the absence of state registra-
tion. 1 35 Similarly, on the surface, Rules 505 and 506 offer great latitude to
issuers who offer securities to accredited investors, 1 36 but small and devel-
oping companies are hamstrung from attracting such investors by strin-
gent antisolicitation provisions. The grudging SEC concessions over the
years are evidence that the SEC fears exactly what state administrators
fear at the local level: the creation of an unregulated process that is an
open invitation to the unscrupulous to prey on the unsuspecting.
However laudatory the federal and state concerns for the innocent
investor, today's highly regulated regime actually offers scant protection
to vulnerable, inexperienced, would-be investors. Fraudulent offerings
130 Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARnozo L. REv. 909 (1994).
131 Id. at 945-48.
132 Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1999).
133 See supra note 3.
134 Rule 254, 17 C.F.R. § 230.254 (1999).
135 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
136 There are no formal disclosure requirements for offers to accredited
investors, such investors are not counted in the total number of permitted purchasers,
and such investors are deemed sophisticated for Rule 506 qualification purposes.
Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (1999).
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are rarely, if ever, registered. 137 Perpetrators know better than to submit
themselves to preoffering scrutiny. Unregistered offerings are made with
absolute effrontery to the securities laws. They are successful in many
instances because the promoters are shrewd, their methods clever, and
their investors trusting. The registration system is irrelevant to such pro-
moters and thus provides no protection to investors. If and when fraudu-
lent schemes are detected and brought to a halt by administrators, all too
often the perpetrators have fled and few assets remain. To charge the
promoters at that point with the strict liability offense of nonregistration
makes the prosecutors' job easy, but does nothing to recover lost invest-
ments. Moreover, fraudulent schemes invariably are so deficient in disclo-
sure that prosecution for disclosure violations also presents no substantial
difficulties. Thus, enlarging the field of potential nonregistered offerings
does not create a greater risk of unworthy or fraudulent offerings; it sim-
ply shifts the prosecutorial focus from registration to disclosure.
Where should reform begin? The following seven considerations
should be placed at the forefront:
(1) Eliminate restraints on solicitation and advertising. Promotional
statements and sales tactics used to attract investors before a disclosure
document is provided should be subject to well-defined liability
standards. 138
(2) Raise the limit for Rule 504 offerings to $10 million and Regula-
tion A to $20 million.139 The current limits are so low as to be unwork-
able for many companies.
(3) Exempt Rule 504 and Regulation A offerings from state registra-
tion. The preemption door was opened a crack for Rule 506 offerings in
1996.140 It is time to widen the opening in order to avoid the left-hand-
137 See, for example, COMPTROLLER'S TASK FORCE ON SECURITIES REGULATION,
STATE OF FLORIDA, REPORT (1986) (on file with author), regarding major securities
frauds in the state, none of which was registered at the federal or state level.
138 See Langevoort, supra note 63, at 25 (suggesting the elimination of the
antisolicitation provisions in favor of a testing-the-waters approach followed by a
cooling-off period between initial solicitations and ultimate sales).
139 It appears that the SEC has authority under section 28 of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77z-3 (Supp. III 1997), to broaden exemption limits without an express
amendment to section 3(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (Supp. III 1997),
increasing the statutory $5 million limit in that provision's grant of authority to the
SEC to create registration exemptions.
140 See supra note 83. The preemption of a registration philosophy that has
existed for nearly ninety years will not be an easy political task. Many state
administrators would agree with Professor Manning Warren:
Experience indicates.., that offerings exempted from advance SEC scrutiny are
more likely to be fraudulent or highly speculative than offerings subject to
registration. Given the large number and the tremendous volume of securities
exempted from federal registration, investor protection cannot be maintained
without review of these offerings by authorities at the state level.
Manning G. Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case Against Preemp-
tion, 25 B.C. L. REv. 495, 528 (1984) (footnote omitted). One might be more sympa-
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giveth-and-right-hand-taketh-away syndrome of concurrent federal and
state jurisdiction. 141
(4) Eliminate Rule 505. If the reforms are made as suggested, there
will be no need for this technical and limited exemption.
(5) Eliminate the disclosure distinction between accredited and
nonaccredited investors. All registration exemptions should be premised
on providing full disclosure to all investors, regardless of sophistication or
wealth.
(6) Eliminate the "sophistication" requirement for private offerings.
Persons of ordinary intelligence should be allowed to act on their own
when given adequate information. Issuers should refrain only from sell-
ing securities to persons who they know or reasonably should know do
not understand the nature or risks of the offering.
(7) Eliminate the integration doctrine or substantially enlarge the
safe harbor for smaller companies that have continual capital demands.
Elimination of the doctrine would not obviate the need for the issuer to
comply with an appropriate exemption for each offering.
The list is not exhaustive. Reforms to the registration process could
make the process quicker and less costly. The SEC currently is proposing
far-reaching reforms to assist large, well-seasoned companies. 14 2 But large
and established companies are not the ones facing procedural difficulties
in raising capital. One of the few bones thrown to small issuers among the
current proposals eases the ability to abandon a registered offering in
order to pursue a private offering.143 Although some issuers may take
advantage of this easing of the traditional integration doctrine, 144 the
proposal offers little to small companies, as it still requires the initial time-
consuming and costly effort of preparing and filing a registration state-
thetic to Professor Warren's argument if promoters of fraudulent and questionable
schemes regularly submitted their offerings to administrative scrutiny. The evidence
suggests otherwise.
141 The proposed preemption of state law, coupled with elimination of
antisolicitation rules, raises the "pump and dump" concerns recently expressed by
SEC staff that led to recent amendments to Rule 504. See supra note 81. The "pump
and dump" syndrome succeeds only with the aid of improper market manipulation by
broker-dealers. It is not at all clear why the fraudulent activities could not be
adequately policed through effective enforcement against broker-dealers. Requiring
issuer registration in each state increases costs and burdens on small companies,
those most in need of the Rule 504 exemption.
142 Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7606A,
Exchange Act Release No. 40632A, [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
86,108, at 81,461-3 (Nov. 13, 1998).
143 Id. at 81,555-81,556. A proposed safe harbor would permit switching from a
registered public offering to a private offering. Disclosure liability would vary
depending on whether the private offering comes within or after thirty days following
abandonment of the registration.
4 Rule 152, 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1999), permits private offerings to precede
public offerings without the consequences of integration. The SEC's current proposal
also would allow private offerings after a registration has been withdrawn.
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ment. For those concerned with the capital-raising problems of small
business, the SEC's current efforts to ameliorate restrictions for large and
established companies is an alarming sign that reform attention is con-
centrated on the wrong end of the spectrum.
V. CONCLUSION
Statistical evidence does not exist regarding the extent to which
small and developing companies have been impeded by federal and state
securities laws from raising capital in a timely and sufficient manner. One
indicium of the demand for capital is the large number of companies that
submit funding proposals to venture capital firms. Given the fact that
such firms insist upon sizeable equity positions and a substantial voice in
company management, the willingness of many fledgling enterprises to
submit themselves to venture capital investment may reflect the lack of
adequate alternatives in the capital market. If the securities laws made it
easier for such companies to solicit and obtain investors, the venture capi-
tal route might not be as attractive. Except for that indicium, and anecdo-
tal evidence gathered each year at the SEC Small Business Forum, 14 5 it is
possible only to surmise the negative impact of the securities laws upon
small business formation and development.
While one may be uncertain as to statistical evidence regarding the
hardships imposed by the current regulatory scheme, there likewise is a
lack of hard evidence regarding the amount of fraud prevented by the
registration and exemption processes. There can be no question that
fraudulent investment schemes abound and, perhaps, have risen in
number with the advent of the Internet. Such schemes do not bother
with registration or the niceties of exemption conditions. The registra-
tion requirement has not deterred fraud; it simply has created a conve-
nient cause of action for nonregistration when and if the fraud is
discovered and the perpetrators apprehended. What registration does
provide is an extensive disclosure document. Yet equally effective disclo-
sure often is achieved in nonregistered offerings through private place-
ment memoranda and similar disclosure documents. 146 The impetus for
disclosure in the nonregistered setting is compliance with exemption
conditions and effective sanctions. If disclosure, which is at the heart of
the registration process, were also the dominant condition for registra-
145 See supra note 6.
146 It will be argued by some that easing the regulatory requirements will create
opportunity for an increase in sham or fraudulent offerings. The response, I believe,
is twofold. First, those bent on deceptive offerings do not adhere to formal
requirements, whatever they may be. Second, preventive measures aimed at
occasional fraudulent offerings are imposing unreasonable transaction costs upon the
vast majority of issuers managed by honest and well-intentioned promoters. Deceptive
and improper offerings should be sanctioned through disclosure standards and
effective enforcement processes. The registration standard is not a necessary, nor
under the circumstances an appropriate, vehicle for addressing the concern.
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tion exemptions, the numerous other technicalities imbedded in the vari-
ous exemptions could be eliminated or substantially modified.
A former SEC Chairman once noted that "[a] Imost every new tech-
nology that has given a lift to the American economy has come from a
new company, struggling in a garage or venturing out to obtain needed
capital from the public."1 47 Whether located in garages or bicycle shops,
young enterprises require continuous financial nourishment. The likes of
the Wright brothers do not come around often, judged by their ingenuity
and ability to invent on the proverbial shoestring. In today's highly tech-
nological environment, the Wright brothers' counterparts and other
would-be inventors generally require access to substantial capital. Our
federal and state securities laws not only fail to adequately address that
concern, the regulatory process impedes efforts to attract potential inves-
tors. Access to capital could be facilitated by substantial revision of
exemption and registration requirements without abating existing disclo-
sure requirements. The SEC has created an impressive stir with its Air-
craft Carrier proposals addressed to large, well-established companies.
1 48
Entrepreneurship in this country would be better served by equal atten-
tion to the more numerous and needy firms at the other end of the busi-
ness spectrum.
147 William J. Casey, SEC Rules 144 and 146 Revisited, 43 BROOK. L. REv. 571, 572
(1977).
148 See supra note 7.
